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The Evolution of Android Malware and Android Analysis Techniques
KIMBERLY TAM, Information Security Group, Royal Holloway, University of London
ALI FEIZOLLAH, Department of Computer System and Technology, University of Malaya
NOR BADRUL ANUAR, Department of Computer System and Technology, University of Malaya
ROSLI SALLEH, Department of Computer System and Technology, University of Malaya
LORENZO CAVALLARO, Information Security Group, Royal Holloway, University of London
With the integration of mobile devices into daily life, smartphones are privy to increasing amounts of sensitive information.
Sophisticated mobile malware, particularly Android malware, acquire or utilize such data without user consent. It is therefore
essential to devise effective techniques to analyze and detect these threats. This article presents a comprehensive survey on
leading Android malware analysis and detection techniques, and their effectiveness against evolving malware. This article
categorizes systems by methodology and date to evaluate progression and weaknesses. This article also discusses evaluations
of industry solutions, malware statistics, malware evasion techniques, and concludes by supporting future research paths.
General Terms: Security CCS Concepts: Security and Privacy→Mobile platform security
Additional Key Words and Phrases: Android, Malware, Static Analysis, Dynamic Analysis, Detection, Classification
1. INTRODUCTION
Smartphones, tablets, and other mobile platforms have quickly become ubiquitous due to their
highly personal and powerful attributes. As the current dominating personal computing device, with
mobile shipments surpassing PCs in 2010 [Menn 2011], smartphones have spurred an increase of
sophisticated mobile malware. Over six million mobile malware samples have been accumulated
by McAfee as of Q4 2014, up 14% over Q3, and roughly 98% of them target primarily Android
devices [McAfee 2015]. Given Android’s all-pervasive nature and the threats against this particular
mobile platform, there is a pressing need for effective analysis techniques to support the develop-
ment of reliable detection and classification tools. In an attempt to evaluate the progress of research
within this specific area of work, this article provides the following contributions.
(1) This work first presents background information on mobile devices and their characteristics.
This leads to a detailed description of the Android operating system, as well as notable Android
malware and general mobile malware traits (see Section 2). Unlike previous mobile malware sur-
veys, this article primarily focuses on the malware traits that hinder accurate studies and presents
them in conjunction with a comprehensive snapshot of today’s Android research techniques.
(2) This work presents a comprehensive study on an extensive and diverse set of Android malware
analysis frameworks, including methods (e.g., static, dynamic, hybrid), year, and outcome. Sim-
ilar studies are then reviewed to identify evolving state-of-the-art techniques in an attempt to
identify their strengths, weaknesses, performance, and uses. For example, this article discusses
how robust some techniques are to major changes within Android, such as replacing the Dalvik
runtime. Studies were primarily selected from well-established and top-ranked research venues.
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However, this work does include, wherever appropriate, a number of additional studies in an
attempt to demonstrate the entire breadth of this research area (see Sections 3 and 4).
(3) Section 5 addresses several Android malware tactics used to obstruct or evade analysis. This
article classifies and describes transformation attacks and examines several advanced malware
evasion techniques, such as encryption, native exploits, and VM-awareness. With that knowl-
edge, this article performs a comparison of malware strengths to common analysis weaknesses,
creating a more comprehensive view than surveys focused on individual aspects. We then con-
firm trends in evasive malware, found in similar studies, with our own experiments.
(4) This work further supports several directions of future research and highlights issues that may not
be apparent when looking at individual studies, including malware trends and plausible research
paths. While some have recently been receiving more attention, others have yet to be explored
sufficiently. Section 6 gives an overview of the state-of-the-art and future research discussion.
Unlike previous works, this article is not a general study on mobile attack vectors or de-
fense [Becher et al. 2011; Enck 2011; Suarez et al. 2014; Faruki et al. 2015], but instead focuses
on Android-related analysis techniques systematically and in detail. As can be seen in Table I,
this differs from a number of previous works. In similar surveys (e.g, on Android malware fami-
lies, evolution, characteristics), although analysis techniques are often mentioned, the information
is scattered throughout the article to support other material. Furthermore, when combined, those
pieces often formed an incomplete picture of all available methods. This study fills that gap by
presenting a method-focused view. Furthermore, unlike similar surveys, e.g. [Vidas et al. 2011],
this paper primarily concentrates on the malware aspects that hinder or deter analysis, detection,
and classification, allowing us to explore the symbiotic relationship between malware and defense.
These findings on how the newest malware and analysis techniques influence each other sets this
survey apart from those focused on purely on malware threats or Android defense. However, while
it is not the main focus, this article does discuss aspects of malware like market infections.
By narrowing the scope, this article provides in-depth studies on both sides of the arms race with
respect to Android malware. A more general study on Android ecosystem weaknesses, e.g., the level
of app developer skills, and protection schemes can be found in [Sufatrio et al. 2015]. This is unlike
the focused details on analysis related techniques, and anti-analysis methods, for Android malware
in this article. The last section containing discussions and future research possibilities also differs
from the most recent, and most relevant, articles. This may be useful to a wide range of readers.
Table I. Comparison of recent surveys and which topics have the most/least coverage (7= little to no content).
Survey Background Threat DyanmicAnalysis Static Analysis
Malware
Tactics
This article (2016) traditional+ Android
discussion +
small study
comprehensive
coverage
comprehensive
coverage
obfuscation +
evasiveness
[Xu et al. 2016] Androidecosystem
privilege
escalation
dataflow and
taint analysis
dataflow +
mentions studies
obfuscation,
moderate detail
[Faruki et al. 2015] Android malware types& actions
moderate
coverage
moderate
coverage obfuscation
[Sufatrio et al. 2015] Android completetaxonomy
mention studies,
7 detail
mention studies,
7 detail 7
[Polla et al. 2013] mobiletech.
attacks +
evolution
mention studies,
7 detail 7 7
[Suarez et al. 2014] smartphones malwareattacks
moderate
coverage
mention studies,
7 detail
obfuscation, but
7 detail
[Zhou and Jiang 2012b] Androidmalware
characterize
malware 7 7
obfuscation
mentioned
[Vidas et al. 2011] Android attack vectors 7 7 7
[Enck 2011] traditional+ Android
malware
attacks
mainly dynamic
taint analysis
details a few
methods 7
[Felt et al. 2011] Androidperm.
permission
abuse 7
details of used
(one) method
challenges for
used method
[Becher et al. 2011] smartphones mobilenetwork
dynamic taint
analysis
function call
analysis 7
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2. BACKGROUND
Prior to discussing current approaches to analyze Android malware, this article begins with this
background section on the evolution of mobile malware. This concludes with a more in-depth sec-
tion on the Android operating system (OS), which is the focus of this article.
2.1. Evolution of Mobile Malware
Initially, when computing systems were primarily understood by a few experts, malware develop-
ment was a test of one’s technical skill and knowledge. For example, the PC Internet worm known
as Creeper displayed taunting messages, but the threat risk was considerably low. However, as time
progressed from the 1980’s, the drive to create malware became less recreational and more profit-
driven as hackers actively sought sensitive, personal, and enterprise information. Malware develop-
ment is now more lucrative and being aided by malware developing tools. In 2013 a report showed
that attackers can earn up to 12,000 USD per month via mobile malware [Register 2013]. This, in
part, resulted in PC malware samples exceeding millions [Dirro 2011], well before smartphones had
even taken off; as of 2009, less than 1,000 mobile malware were known [Dirro 2011].
Since 2009, however, the rise of mobile malware has been explosive, with new technologies pro-
viding new access points for profitable exploitations [McAfee 2013; 2014]. Moreover, an increase
in black markets (i.e., markets to sell stolen information, system vulnerabilities, malware source
code, malware developing tools) has provided more incentive for profit-driven malware [Informa-
tionWeek 2014]. Although researchers may borrow and adapt traditional PC analysis solutions, the
basic principles of mobile security differs due to inherently different computing systems. Further-
more, despite improvements to their computing power and capabilities, mobile devices still possess
relatively limited resources (e.g., battery power) which limits on-device analysis. For further study
on the similarities between traditional and mobile malware construction (e.g., in terms of features,
methods, threats) refer to [Felt et al. 2011; Branco et al. 2012; Bayer et al. 2009; Rudd et al. 2016].
For more Android malware capabilities and vulnerability exploit details, see [Drake et al. 2014].
2.1.1. Android Popularity and Malware. Based on a report from F-Secure, Android contributed to
79% of all mobile malware in 2012, compared to 66.7% in 2011 and 11.25% in 2010 [F-Secure
2013]. In accordance with this pattern, Symantec determined that the period from April 2013 to
June 2013 witnessed an Android malware increase of almost 200%. Furthermore, in February 2014,
Symantec stated that an average of 272 new malware and five new malware families targeting An-
droid were discovered every month [Symantec 2014]. One of the prime contributing factors to this
immense malware growth is Android’s popularity (Fig. 1), its open-source operating system [Teufl
et al. 2014], and its application markets. This includes the official Google Play, which has some vet-
ting processes, as well as “unofficial” third party markets across the world (e.g., SlideME [SlideME
2013]). In general, third party markets have higher infection rates than Google Play, but not all
countries have had access to the official market since its introduction. Looking towards 2016 and
beyond, it is possible that Google will be adopting manual approaches for vetting applications in an
attempt to lower malware existence further on the Google Play [Petrovan 2015].
Fig. 1. Comparison of worldwide smartphone sales by Operating Systems (OSs).
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Currently, the popularity of Android devices makes it a desirable target. However, its popularity
is relatively recent, as illustrated in Fig. 1. Its popularity begun roughly in 2010, as shown by the
statistics provided by Canalys (2001-2004) and Gartner (2005-2014) [Gartner 2015]. Interestingly,
this figure also depicts a sizable dip in Symbian market shares during 2005, which may be the
result of the first mobile worm, Cabir, discovered in 2004 and designed for Symbian [Gostev and
Maslennikov 2009]. Fig. 1 also illustrates why certain studies spanning 2000-2008 focus entirely
on Symbian and Windows mobile malware threats; they were the most popular operating systems
(OSs) during that period [Dunham 2009; Aubrey-Derrick and Sahin 2008].
As general smartphone sales rose dramatically in 2010, several alternatives rose to compete with
Symbian. Studies such as [La Polla et al. 2013] and [Felt et al. 2011] reflected this shift by in-
cluding emerging OSs such as Android and iOS, and by 2012 Android began to clearly dominate.
Studies then began to focus purely on Android as Android malware skyrocketed [Symantec 2013;
Zhou and Jiang 2012b]. Furthermore, just as the sophisticated Cabir worm targeted Symbian when
it was the most popular in 2004, the Trojan Obad, considered one of the most sophisticated mobile
Trojans today, was discovered in 2013 and targets Android [Unuchek 2013]. In general, nearly half
of all mobile malware as of 2014 are Trojans, and are being tailored to target specific demograph-
ics. Together, Russia, India, and Vietnam account for over 50% of all unique users attacked in the
world [Securelist 2013], while USA infections, as determined with three months of DNS traffic,
is less than 0.0009% [Lever et al. 2013]. However, this method indirectly measured domain-name
resolution traces. At the end of 2014, McAfee also analyzed regional infections rates of devices run-
ning their security products. They found the infection rates in Africa and Asia were roughly 10%,
while Europe and both Americas had rates between 6% and 8%. Further discussions on varying
infection rates due to different geological and virtual markets factors can be found in Section 6.
2.1.2. Traits of Android Malware. As mobiles are constantly crossing physical and network do-
mains, they are exposed to more infection venues than traditional PCs. For example, by making full
use of their host’s physical movements, mobile worms are capable of propagating across network
domains more easily [Sandeep Sarat 2007]. Additionally, with over a million available apps and
near instantaneous installation, mobile devices are subjected to a high turnover of potentially mali-
cious software [Kuittenin 2013]. Smartphones also accept a wide set of touch commands, such as
swipe and tap, which is unlike the traditional mouse and keyboard input. This added complexity can
complicate analysis, as it is hard to automatically traverse all possible execution paths (see Section
5). Mobile devices are also accessible, and vulnerable, through multiple (sometimes simultaneous)
“connections” to the outside world, such as email, WiFi, GPRS, HSCSD, 3G, LTE, Bluetooth, SMS,
MMS, and web browsers. They also utilize a complex plethora of technologies such as camera, com-
pass, and accelerometers, which may also be vulnerable, e.g., via drivers [Zaddach et al. 2014].
As an exploit attack, an alarming number of Android mobile malware send background SMS
messages to premium rate numbers to generate revenue (similar malware still affect PCs via phone
lines). Although attempts to mitigate this have been made in Android operating system (OS) 4.3,
released in 2012, more robust solutions such as AirBag [Xiang et al. 2014] are still necessary. This
is evident as background SMS are considered a high risk event by users, as shown in a study ranking
smartphone user concerns [Felt et al. 2012], and since malware still exhibit this behavior [McAfee
2014]. As an example, it was estimated that over a thousand devices were affected with one, partic-
ular, malicious version of the Angry Birds game. Once installed, the malware secretly sent premium
SMS each time the game was started, costing roughly 15 GBP per text [Sophos 2012]. This is just
one example of how, since 2010, the number of profit-driven malware has reportedly surpassed the
number of non-profit driven malware, and the gap continues to grow steadily [Techcrunch 2013].
Often, once malware is installed (e.g., social-engineering, drive-by-download), they use privilege
escalation attacks to exploit Android OS or kernel vulnerabilities. When successful, the malware
gains root access of the device [Zhou and Jiang 2012b]. Primarily, these attacks provide the mal-
ware with access to the lower, higher-privileged, architectural layers (see Fig. 2). Once compro-
mised, besides premium calls or SMS, malware often leak data pertaining to the device, owner, or
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both [McAfee 2014]. Similarly, malware known as spyware spy or monitor a target by exploiting
mobile devices. Spying malware are also often bots, as they are controlled remotely via a command
and control server. However, any malware can be one of many bots as long as there is network
of compromised or malicious devices. These bots can also be used for denial of service (DoS)
attacks by rerouting traffic to specific address(es). Similarly, malware can deny services of other
apps (including anti-virus apps) by overusing resources (e.g., battery, bandwidth) and tampering
with necessary files or processes. See the [Vidas et al. 2011] survey for focus on Android malware
security threats and a few common defense mitigation techniques.
2.1.3. Notable Android Malware. There have been many malware families discovered from 2011
to 2015, but there have been only a few pivotal samples worth mentioning at this point. These
sophisticated samples may exhibit characteristics already seen in traditional malware, but are new
— perhaps even the first of its kind — in the mobile area. Majority of these samples have also been
discovered between 2014 and 2015, showing that mobile malware is, in some ways, catching up
to traditional malware. The Android malware NotCompatible.C infected over four million devices
to send spam emails, buy event tickets in bulk, and crack WordPress accounts [Strazzere 2014].
Furthermore, this malware is persistent and self-protecting via redundant actions and encryption,
making static analysis very difficult. Conversely, malware such as Dendroid and Android.hehe are
more difficult to analyze dynamically, as they are aware of emulated surroundings (details in Section
4.3), and have provenly evaded Google Play’s vetting processes. The last notable Android malware
mentioned here is the first Android bootkit, which can evade AV products as it only exists in the
boot partition, which is read-only memory. In the future, memory analysis may also be necessary to
analyze malware, such as Oldboot, as they can only be found in volatile memory [Liam 2014].
2.2. Android Overview
2.2.1. Android Architecture. The open-source Android OS was initially released in 2008, runs on
top of a modified Linux kernel, and runs all Java written applications in isolation. Normally, this
means all apps are run separately within their own Dalvik virtual machines, but with the release of
Android 5.0 in 2014, this was changed to an ahead-of-time compiler, ART, as opposed to the Dalvik
just-in-time compiler. =As discussed further on, this change has negatively affected several, current,
state-of-the-art analysis frameworks. The Android hardware consists of a baseband ARM processor
(future tablets may use the Intel x86 Atom), a separate application processor, and devices such as
GPS and Bluetooth. Fig. 2 gives an overview of the described Android architecture.
In order to access the system, all Java-written apps must be granted permissions by the Android
Permission System during installation (more in Section 3). Several studies evaluating the effective-
ness of Android permissions can be found in [Felt et al. 2011; Au et al. 2011; Wei et al. 2012a; Au
et al. 2012]. Once installed, i.e., permissions granted and enforced by the kernel, apps can interact
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Fig. 2. Overview of the Android Operating System (OS) Architecture.
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with each other and the system through well-defined application program interface (API) calls. Un-
fortunately, this also applies to anti-virus apps, preventing these products from easily introspecting
other apps. Because of this, most anti-virus solutions are signature-based and may be more viable
implemented in markets instead of on-device (e.g., [Chakradeo et al. 2013; Zhou et al. 2012]).
The Android apps themselves are comprised of a number of components: activities; broadcast
receivers; services; and content providers. Content providers manage access to structured sets of data
by encapsulating them for security mechanisms, while the other three are activated by intents. The
Android intent is an abstract description of an operation one component requests another component
to do, and is composed of asynchronous messages exchanged to perform this task. While broadcast
receivers and services tend to run in the background, activities are the most visible component to
the user, and is often what handles user interactions like button clicking.
2.2.2. Comparison to Other Mobile Operating Systems. This section summarizes core differences
between the Android OS and other mobile OSs (see their popularity in Fig. 1). In particular, this ar-
ticle outline differences in architecture and how applications are handled and separated from the rest
of the system. This helps determine their vulnerability to malware infections and malware exploits.
iOS: Released in 2007, iOS (previously iPhone OS) runs on XNU, a hybrid kernel. Apps run
on top of the OS, which is comprised of four abstractions layers: Cocoa Touch, Media, Core Ser-
vices, and Core OS. Users interact with the touch layer, triggering apps that then interact with the
media and core layers for fundamental system services. All layers use low-level features supplied
by the core layer, including the security framework. Unlike other systems, iOS does not possess a
sophisticated permissions system, and instead relies on the Apple store to screen apps [Apple 2015].
Windows OS: Developed by Microsoft and released in April 2000, Windows OS is based on the
Windows CE hybrid kernel known as NT. Both custom and Windows applications are run on top
of the OS in user mode. Apps in this less privileged layer can be shut down without harming lower
layers and are granted capabilities like Android permissions, but with less options [Au et al. 2011].
The highest privileged mode is the kernel mode. Earlier OS versions had a loophole which allowed
threads to be put in and out of kernel mode, giving attackers access to kernel-level resources.
Palm: Palm OS was released in 1996, but discontinued after being succeeded by WebOS in 2009.
WebOS runs on a monolithic (Linux) kernel, and runs all apps in a UI System manager. Only the
read permission is granted to third party apps, but certified apps can have access to more sensitive
APIs [Kingpin 2001]. These APIs are delivered as Mojo, a JavaScript framework that lies between
the applications and the core OS, supporting common application-level functions, access to built-in
applications, native services, and to protect the core OS from malicious applications.
BlackBerry: Created by Research in Motion (RIM) BlackBerry OS was released in 1999, with a
Java virtual machine kernel type. Apps are organized into sections of the app infrastructure layer, but
separated from the OS system services. These partitions include native, web, and Android apps with
their own respective infrastructure partitions in the layer below. These layers and their application
context provide security to the OS and individual apps. Users define one set of permissions which
is assigned to all apps on the device; permissions are not customizable per app [BlackBerry 2013].
Symbian: The Symbian OS, released in 1997, runs on a EKA2 kernel which enabled a real-
time, priority, multithreaded OS. The kernel does as little as possible, outsourcing the details to
extensions, services, and drivers layered on top of the nano-kernel, to maximize device stability.
The topmost layer is the user interface which interacts with both the application services layer
below and the generic (not base) OS services layer. In Maemo, Symbian’s successor, there is no
permission system and no isolation between applications [Dunham 2009].
3. TAXONOMY OF MOBILE MALWARE ANALYSIS
The risks introduced by mobile malware motivate the development of robust and accurate analysis
methods. One way to counter or detect malware is with the use of anti-virus (AV) products. Un-
fortunately, as mentioned previously, on-device AV applications face difficulties as they are just as
limited as normal applications. Hence cloud- and signature-based detection is more popular.
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A malware signature is created by extracting binary patterns, or random snippets, from a sample.
Therefore, any app encountered in the future with the same signature is considered a sample of that
malware. However, this approach has at least two major drawbacks. Firstly, this method is ineffective
for detecting unknown threats, i.e., zero-day attacks, as no previously-generated signature could
exist. This is costly as additional methods are needed to detect the threat, create a new signature,
and distribute it. Secondly, malware can easily bypass signature-based identification by changing
small pieces of its software without affecting the semantics [Rastogi et al. 2013]. Section 3 provides
further details on obfuscation techniques including those that break signature-based detection. As a
result of these downfalls, exemplified by the Google App Verification system released in 2012 [Jiang
2012], more efforts have been dedicated to implementing semantic signatures; signatures based on
functions or methods [Crussell et al. 2012; Zhou et al. 2012]. Alternatively, a wider set of available
app features may be analyzed statically or dynamically to detect, or classify, malicious applications.
In the remainder of this section, we examine such methods, their applications, and feature choice.
Although not discussed thoroughly within this article, it is natural that research on newer mobile
environments builds upon decades of traditional static and dynamic malware research. For example,
although decompiling and virtualization are traditional methods, the particulars of code packaging
and VM architectures differ for Android. Furthermore, as discussed previously, mobile malware is
beginning to match traditional malware in sophistication and construction. Thus, it is prudent to
adapt and further develop traditional methods to deal with similar threats. Nonetheless, the nature
of Android apps and the specifics of its architecture create divergent methods, as discussed below.
3.1. Static Analysis
Static analysis examines a program without executing any code. Although it could potentially reveal
all possible paths of execution, there are several limitations. Furthermore, alternative code compil-
ers mean traditional analyses and signature methods (e.g., Windows whole-file, section, and code
hashing) are incompatible with Android. All static methods, however, are vulnerable to obfuscations
(e.g., encryption) that remove, or limit, access to the code [Moser et al. 2007]. Similarly, the injec-
tion of non-Java code, network activity, and the modification of objects at run-time (e.g., reflection)
are outside the scope of static analysis as they are only visible during execution. As later shown in
Section 5.5, these do occur frequently in Android malware. Android app source code is also rarely
available, so many frameworks analyze the app bytecode inside the app package (APK) instead.
APK contents are described as follows, including changes introduced with the new ART runtime:
• META-INF folder holds: manifest file, app RSA, list resources, and all resource SHA-1 digests;
• The assets directory holds: files apps can retrieve with the AssetManager;
• AndroidManifest.xml: an additional Android manifest file describing package name, permis-
sions, version, referenced library files for the app, and app components, i.e., activities, services,
content providers, and broadcast receivers;
• The classes.dex file: contains all Android classes compiled into dex file format for the
Dalvik VM. For ART, Dalvik bytecode is stored in an .odex file (pre-processed version of .dex);
• The folder lib: holds compiled code in sub folders specific to the processor software layer and
named after the processor (e.g., armeabi holds compiled code of all ARM based processors);
• The folder res: holds resources not compiled into resources.arsc;
• resources.arsc is a file containing precompiled resources.
Two essential APK components for Android static analysis and detection are (1) the Android-
Manifest.xml, which describes permissions, package name, version, referenced libraries, and
app components (e.g., activities) and (2) classes.dex, which contains all Android classes com-
piled into a Dalvik compatible, dex file format. We are unaware of any studies analyzing odex files.
3.1.1. Permissions. Permissions such as SEND SMS are an important feature for analysis as
most actions (e.g., a series of APIs) require particular permissions in order to be invoked [Wu
et al. 2012]. For example, before accessing the camera, the Android system checks if the requesting
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Fig. 3. Approaches to Android static analysis. (Jimple = simplified Java source code, Other* = source code [Au et al. 2011],
bytecode [Davis et al. 2012; Backes et al. 2013], Manifest [Wei et al. 2012a], and module decoupling [Zhou et al. 2013]).
# Paper 10 [Au et al. 2012] 20 [Felt et al. 2011]
1 [Arp et al. 2014] 11 [Grace et al. 2012] 21 [Hoffmann et al. 2013]
2 [Wu et al. 2012] 12 [Kim et al. 2012] 22 [Zheng et al. 2013a]
3 [Sanz et al. 2013] 13 [Zheng et al. 2012] 23 [Amamra et al. 2012]
4 [Lagerspetz et al. 2014] 14 [Backes et al. 2013] 24 [Huang et al. 2014]
5 [Feng et al. 2014] 15 [Davis et al. 2012] 25 [Yang et al. 2015]
6 [Azim and Neamtiu 2013] 16 [Wei et al. 2012a] 26 [Mahmood et al. 2014]
7 [Crussell et al. 2012] 17 [Zhou et al. 2013] 27 [Arzt et al. 2014]
8 [Chen et al. 2013] 18 [Zhou et al. 2012] 28 [Li et al. 2015]
9 [Yajin Zhou 2013] 19 [Au et al. 2011]
app has the CAMERA permission [Felt et al. 2011]. These requested permissions must be declared
within the AndroidManifest.xml. As the manifest is easy to obtain statically, many frameworks, such
as PScout [Au et al. 2012], Whyper [Pandita et al. 2013], and [Felt et al. 2011; Wei et al. 2012a], use
static analysis to evaluate the risks of the Android permission system and individual apps. Although
their methods vary, their conclusions agreed that the evolution of the Android permission system
continues to introduce dangerous permissions and fails to deter malware from exploiting vulnera-
bilities and performing escalation. During our experiments on over nine thousand malware samples,
we also found this to be true. Three primary reasons for why this may be so are poor documentation,
poor developer habits, and malicious behaviors [Felt et al. 2011]. Two important studies have found
a detrimental lack of documentation and comprehension concerning APIs and their required per-
missions, despite very little redundancy within the growing Android permissions system [Au et al.
2012; Pandita et al. 2013]. Furthermore, [Wei et al. 2012a] found that the number of permissions in
Android releases from 2009 to 2011 had increased steadily, and mostly in dangerous categories. It
has also been shown by other studies, and our experiments in Section 5.5, that malware request more
permissions than benign apps. In the million apps Andrubis received from 2010 to 2014, malicious
apps requested, on average, 12.99 permissions, while benign apps asked for an average of 4.5.
3.1.2. Intents. Within Android, intents are abstract objects containing information on an opera-
tion to be performed for an app component. Based on the intent, the appropriate action (e.g., taking
a photo, dialing a number) is performed by the system and can therefore be useful for analysis.
In one scenario, private data can be leaked to a malicious app that requested the data via intents
defined in its Android manifest file. In DroidMat [Wu et al. 2012] intents, permissions, compo-
nent deployment, and APIs were extracted from the Manifest and analyzed with several machine
learning algorithms such as, k-means, k-nearest neighbors, and naive Bayes, to develop malware
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Table II. Decompiled DEX formats and uses based on how they have been used by existing tools.
Format Example Tool Performance Coverage
Dalvik Bytecode dexdump [Kim et al. 2012] false+ (15-18%) unknown(∼75%)
7 dynamic code
7 instruction change
∼ reflection 7 JNI
Java Bytecode Pegasus [Chen et al. 2013] false+ (12.5%) ∼ reflection ∼ intents
Source Code ded [Desnosi and Gueguen 2012] accuracy (94)%
7 dynamic code
7 instruction change
∼ number recovery
Smali SAAF [Hoffmann et al. 2013] accuracy (99.9%) 7 obfuscation 7 runtime
Assembly dedexer [Felt et al. 2011] false+ (4%) ∼ reflection 3 intents
Jar dex2jar [Gibler et al. 2012] false+ (35%) 7 ad libs, JNI, intents,Java data structures
Jimple FlowDroid [Arzt et al. 2014] 93% recall, 86% precision 7reflection
detection systems that were evaluated to be better than previous systems. Similarly, DREBIN [Arp
et al. 2014] collected intents, permissions, app components, APIs, and network addresses from ma-
licious APKs, but instead used support vector machines. The results of the experiment showed that
DREBIN detected 94% of the malware with a low false positive rate.
3.1.3. Hardware Components. Another part of the Android Manifest that has been used for static
analysis is the listed hardware components. DREBIN [Arp et al. 2014] utilized these components
listed in the Manifest in its analysis. This can be effective as apps must request all the hardware (e.g.,
microphone, GPS) they require in order to function. Certain combinations of requested hardware can
therefore imply maliciousness. For example, there is no apparent necessity for a calculator app to
require 3G and GPS access. Dynamic analysis can be used to analyze hardware usage, but these
normally analyze API calls, or system calls, as it is easier than analyzing the hardware directly.
3.1.4. Dex files. The dex or classes.dex files can be found in the Android APK. They are difficult
for humans to read, and are often decompiled first into a more comprehensible format, such as Soot.
There are many levels of formats, from low level bytecode, to assembly code, to human-readable
source code. See Table II for a brief comparison of disassembled formats. Both PScout [Au et al.
2012] and AppSealer [Zhang and Yin 2013] use Soot directly on the dex, see Fig. 3(a), to acquire
Java bytecode, while [Enck et al. 2011] uses ded/DARE, and Pegasus created its own “translation
tool” [Chen et al. 2013]. Alternatively, [Felt et al. 2011] decompiles dex into an assembly-like code
with dedexer, while others choose to study Dalvik bytecode [Kim et al. 2012; Grace et al. 2012;
Zhang and Yin 2013], smali [Hoffmann et al. 2013; Zheng et al. 2012; Zheng et al. 2013a; Zhou
et al. 2014], or the source code [Crussell et al. 2012; Desnosi and Gueguen 2012]. In general, more
drastic decompiling methods have a higher fail rate or error rate, due to the significant change from
the old format to the new. Some of which can be amended by post-processing. From the decompiled
format, features (e.g., classes, APIs, methods), structure sequences, and program dependency graphs
can be extracted and analyzed. Dex files have also been decompiled and analyzed to track the flow
of intents in interprocess communications (IPC), also known as inter-component communications
(ICC) [Yang et al. 2015; Li et al. 2015], and to aid smart stimulation [Mahmood et al. 2014].
Different types of static analysis, such as feature, graph, or structure-based (details in Section
4), may also be combined for a richer, more robust analysis. For example, as seen in Fig. 3(b), the
framework [Zhou et al. 2013] combines structural and feature analysis by decoupling modules and
analyzing extracted semantic feature vectors to detect destructive payloads. Also shown in Fig. 3(b),
[Hoffmann et al. 2013] extracts both feature and dependency graphs, via smali program slices, to
find method parameter values. Conversely, ADAM [Zheng et al. 2013a] tested if anti-malware prod-
ucts could detect apps repackaged by altering dependency graphs and obfuscated features. While
obfuscation methods for mobile malware (e.g., native code, encryption) existed before Android in
Symbian malware [Schmidt et al. 2009b], and despite well matured static methods, obfuscation is
still an open issue as of 2014 [Sophos 2014]. This is further discussed in Section 5.
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3.2. Dynamic Analysis
In contrast to static analysis, dynamic analysis executes a program and observes the results. Applied
simplistically it provides limited code coverage, as only one path is shown per execution, but can
be improved with stimulation. As Android apps are highly interactive, many behaviors need to be
triggered via the interface, received intents, or with smart, automatic event injectors [Azim and
Neamtiu 2013; Machiry et al. 2013; Mahmood et al. 2014]. Another degree of complexity is also
added, as the malware is “live” and able to view and interact with its environment. This has led to
two different types of dynamic analysis: in-the-box analysis and out-of-the-box analysis.
If the analysis resides on the same permission level, or architectural layer, as the malicious soft-
ware, malware can detect and tamper with the analysis. This is known as in-guest, or in-the-box,
analysis as it relies on the Dalvik runtime (or the ART runtime) and/or the Android OS. The upside
to this approach is easier access to certain OS-level data (see Fig. 5). On the other hand, if the analy-
sis was to reside in a lower layer, say the kernel, it would increase security, but make it more difficult
to intercept app data and communications. To overcome this weakness, there are several methods
to fill the semantic gap, i.e. recreating OS/app semantics from a lower observation point such as
the emulator [Garfinkel and R. 2003; Tam et al. 2015b]. Details of in-the-box, out-of-the-box, and
virtualization can be found in further down, specifically in subsections 3.2.1-3.2.3.
To better understand the progression of dynamic analysis for Android, see Fig. 4. Here we attempt
to illustrate the number of different architectural layers (e.g., hardware, kernel, app, or OS) being
studied in dynamic analysis frameworks from 1997–2015. One interesting trend is the increasing
amount of multi-layered analyses, which increases the number of unique and analyzable features but
with increased overheads. Different analysis environments are also represented here, including em-
ulators, real devices, and hybrids of both [Vidas et al. 2014]. Again, because the malware is running
during analysis, the choice of environment is more complicated. In 2013, Obad was the first Android
malware to detect emulated environments and choose not to exhibit malicious behaviors [Unuchek
2013]. Despite this, most analyses still implement emulators (discussed in Section 6).
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Fig. 4. Dynamic analysis studies based on different Android architectural layers. (CN = Cell Network, K = Kernel)
# Paper 11 [Ongtang et al. 2009] 22 [Felt et al. 2011]
1 [Moreau et al. 1996] 12 [Yan and Yin 2012] 23 [Tam et al. 2015b]
2 [Samfat and Molva 1997] 13 [Vidas et al. 2014] 24 [Dini et al. 2012]
3 [Jacoby 2004] 14 [Amamra et al. 2012] 25 [Zheng et al. 2012]
4 [Miettinen et al. 2006] 15 [Zaddach et al. 2014] 26 [Xiang et al. 2014]
5 [Nash et al. 2005] 16 [Amos et al. 2013] 27 [Shabtai et al. 2012]
6 [Cheng et al. 2007] 17 [Enck et al. 2010] 28 [Bugiel et al. 2011]
7 [Becher and Freiling 2008] 18 [Yan and Yin 2012] 29 [Xu et al. 2012]
8 [Becher and Hund 2008] 19 [Bla¨sing et al. 2010] 30 [Chen et al. 2013]
9 [Miettinen et al. 2006] 20 [Burguera et al. 2011] 31 [Backes et al. 2014]
10 [Bose et al. 2008] 21 [Andrus et al. 2011] 32 [Li et al. 2014]
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For stimulating applications, the DynoDroid [Machiry et al. 2013] system was developed by us-
ing real user interactions for analysis; it collected user activities, such as tapping the screen, long
pressing and dragging, in order to find bugs in Android apps. Alternatively, hybrid solutions like
EvoDroid [Mahmood et al. 2014], use static and dynamic analysis to explore as much of the appli-
cation code as possible in the fewest number of executions. Besides increasing code coverage, user
interactions with apps may also be analyzed for malware detection. By crowdsourcing scenarios,
PuppetDroid [Gianazza et al. 2014] captured user interactions as stimulation traces and reproduced
the UI interactions to stimulate malicious behaviors during dynamic analysis. This is based on the
assumption that similar user interactions patterns can be used to detect malicious apps, as malware
are often repackaged code or variants of each other (i.e., a malware family).
3.2.1. In-the-box (in-guest) Analysis. In this method of analysis, the examination and/or gath-
ering of data occurs on the same privilege level (e.g., architectural level) as the malware. This
often requires modifying, or being finely tuned into, the OS or the Dalvik VM. For example, DIVI-
LAR [Zhou et al. 2014] inserts hooks into the Android internals, i.e. Dalvik VM, to run apps modi-
fied against repackaging. Furthermore Mockdroid [Beresford et al. 2011] modified the OS permis-
sion checks to revoke system accesses at run-time. The advantage to these methods are that memory
structures and high OS-level data are easily accessible. Access to libraries, methods, and APIs are
also available, but not necessarily granted to applications because of permissions. The downside of
in-guest analysis, as mentioned previously, is that the “close proximity” to the application leaves
the analysis open to being attacked or bypassed, e.g., with native code or reflection [Xu et al. 2012].
It is possible to increase transparency by hiding processes or loaded libraries, but this is impos-
sible to achieve from the user space alone. Additional downfalls to editing the OS or Dalvik are
(1) necessary modifications to multiple Android OS versions, (2) more potential software bugs, and
(3) the replacement of the Dalvik just-in-time compiler with an ahead-of-time compiler (ART [Vitas
2013]). Therefore, while in-guest methods already require moderate to heavy modifications between
most Android OS versions, with the complete change from the Dalvik runtime to the ART runtime,
many in-guest analysis need fundamental changes to adapt. Alternatively, kernel-level frameworks
would grant the framework a higher privilege level than user-level apps, increasing transparency and
security, unless the malware gained root privileges via a root exploit. Although high-level seman-
tics are more difficult to analyze out-of-the box, this method can provide greater portability across
different Android OS versions as there is more stability in the lower architecture layers.
3.2.2. Out-of-the-box Analysis. VM-based analyses, like traditional methods, utilize emulators
and virtual environments to provide increased security through isolation. While both emulated en-
vironments and virtualization achieve isolation by sandboxing dangerous software, emulators also
provide complete control and oversight of the environment. For example, sandboxing native code
(i.e., non-Java code compiled to run with a Android CPU) in the future may add further protection
to the Android devices [Afonso et al. 2016]. Furthermore, full system emulation completely emu-
lates a real device, which includes all system functionality and required peripherals. Traditionally,
this includes CPU, memory, and devices such as network interface cards, but for smartphones this
may include the additional cameras, GPS, or accelerometer. While the mobile emulator Mobile-
Sandbox [Becher and Freiling 2008] works for both Windows and Android, most other systems like
Andrubis [Weichselbaum et al. 2012], DroidScope [Yan and Yin 2012], CopperDroid [Tam et al.
2015b], and [Winter et al. 2012; Frenzel et al. 2010], are purely Android emulators. In particular,
these were built on top of QEMU, an open source CPU emulator available for ARM hardware.
Unfortunately, malware can, and have, countered emulation by detecting false, non-real, envi-
ronments and can stop or misdirect the analysis. For example, multiple personalities can be used
to fool detection systems. There are many samples of traditional PC malware that do exactly this,
and more mobile malware are now exhibiting similar levels of sophisticated VM-awareness (details
in Section 5). While it was accepted that out-of-the-box analysis meant less high-level semantic
data is available, it was previously believed that recreating high-level behaviors, such as IPC/ICC ,
was impossible outside the box. This was proven false by the CopperDroid framework [Tam et al.
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Fig. 5. Data and sandboxing available at all Android architectural layers.
2015b]. Furthermore, with CopperDroid’s agnostic approach to the Android internals, it is able to
switch between Android OS versions seamlessly, including the new 5.0 version running ART.
3.2.3. Virtualization. Analysis using virtualization assigns the system (e.g., hardware) a privileged
state to prevent unrestricted access by sandboxed software. This partial emulation is lighter than full
emulation, but, if implemented correctly, still provides robust security. Furthermore, in contrast to
emulators, guest systems within VMs can execute non-privileged instructions directly on the hard-
ware, greatly improving performance. Currently, Android app sandboxing is handled by the kernel,
but despite this, malware can still compromise the system using privilege escalation. To improve
isolation, or to host multiple phone images (e.g., Cells with lightweight OS virtualization [Andrus
et al. 2011]), additional virtualization can be introduced at the kernel or hypervisor levels. Highly
privileged kernel- or hypervisor-level (either bare-metal or hosted) sandboxing are less susceptible
to corruption and, as seen in Fig. 5, provide easier access to kernel data such as system calls [Bugiel
et al. 2011; Becher and Hund 2008]. The negatives of virtualization, and some emulators, is the iso-
lation introduces a discontinuity between the data seen by the analysis, and high-level OS data. Such
semantic gaps are reconstructable with virtual machine introspection (VMI). However, the Android
Dalvik VM complicates VMI as two-level VMI might be necessary.
If implemented, an Android hypervisor would reside on top of the hardware (i.e., highest pos-
sible permission level) where it can provide the most isolation and security. Both desktops and
server domains use this method for intrusion detection, isolation, and preventing rootkits. In 2008,
[Heiser 2008] was one of the first to analyze the security benefits of hypervisors in embedded
(e.g., mobile) devices. Unfortunately, the majority of on-shelf ARMs cannot currently support pure-
virtualization1, and so alternative solutions have relied on other methods, such as para-virtualization
or hardware extensions, to achieve similar affects. Para-virtualization simulates the underlying
hardware with software and requires modifications to critical parts of the virtualized OS. Using
para-virtualization and a Xen hypervisor, [Hwang et al. 2008] successfully created a secure hyper-
visor, or virtual machine monitor (VMM), on an ARM processor. In contrast, pure-virtualization
(i.e., hardware virtualization) utilizes built-in processor hardware to run unmodified virtual operat-
ing systems. This has the advantage of being able to host guest OS kernels without modification.
Introducing hardware extensions can enhance the ARM processor in order to grant pure-
virtualization capabilities, which is significantly less complex than para-virtualization [Varanasi
and Heiser 2011]. In 2012, [Frenzel et al. 2010] used an ARM TrustZone processor extension to
achieve effects similar to full virtualization, and in 2013, [Smirnov et al. 2013] implemented and
evaluated a fully operational hypervisor that successfully ran multiple VMs on an ARM Cortex
A9-based server. Besides added security, these studies have also demonstrated that hypervisors for
mobiles often require an order of magnitude fewer lines of code than full OS hypervisors. This
implies better performance and less software bugs introduced.
1The Cortex-A15 has full virtualization support, but has only been installed in a few selected devices.
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3.3. Hybrid Analysis
By combining static and dynamic analysis, hybrid methods can increase robustnesses, monitor
edited apps, increase code coverage, and find vulnerabilities. For example, [Backes et al. 2013]
and [Chen et al. 2013] statically inserted hooks into functions (i.e., sensitive APIs) which provided
run-time data for dynamic policy enforcement. Similarly, [Ongtang et al. 2009] governed static
permission assignments and then dynamically analyzed Android inter-process communications, as
dictated by its policies. Although unable to analyze ICC, i.e. IPC, Harvester [Rasthofer et al. 2015]
can obtain important runtime data via a hybrid, static and dynamic, method.
Hybrid malware detectors like [Bla¨sing et al. 2010] have also used static analysis to asses an app’s
danger before dynamically logging its system calls with kernel-level sandboxing. Alternatively, to
increase code coverage, SmartDroid [Zheng et al. 2012], EvoDroid [Mahmood et al. 2014], and
[Spreitzenbarth et al. 2013] use static analysis to find all possible activity paths before guiding the
dynamic analysis through them. A5 [Vidas et al. 2014] also employed a similar hybrid analysis
for detection, triggering intents found in the code in order to examine all paths of execution for
malicious behaviors. A5 also utilized both real devices and emulators (one or the other) in their ex-
periments. Concolic testing, a mixture of static and dynamic analysis, has also been used to uncover
malicious information leaks in Android apps [Anand et al. 2012].
4. MALWARE ANALYSIS APPROACHES FOR ANDROID
This section provides detailed descriptions of various analysis techniques. While most are used both
statically and dynamically, several are unique to one or the other (see Table III on page 16).
4.1. Analysis Techniques
4.1.1. Network Traffic. As we discover in our analysis within Section 5, most apps, normal and
malicious, require network connectivity. In [Zhou and Jiang 2012b], 93% of collected Android mal-
ware samples made network connections to a malicious =resource. Additionally, [Sarma et al. 2012]
analyzed 150,000 Android applications in 2012 and found that 93.38% of malicious apps required
network access while only 68.50% of normal apps did so. Similarly, in [Sanz et al. 2013], permis-
sions of 2,000 apps were analyzed to find that over 93% of malicious applications requested net-
work connectivity. This demonstrates that network access is requested by most apps, but particularly
by the malicious ones. Alternatively, network payloads may contain malicious drive-by-downloads
flowing into the device, or leaked data flowing out of the device. Network ports are therefore often
sinks in taint analysis and lead to more thorough network packet analysis.
Frameworks studying network communications have been implemented on both real and emu-
lated devices [Shabtai et al. 2012; Bugiel et al. 2011; Wei et al. 2012b], as well as cell networks,
which is computationally easier on individual mobile devices but must protect communication chan-
nels from attacks [Sandeep Sarat 2007; Jin and Wang 2013; Moreau et al. 1996; Samfat and Molva
1997; Burguera et al. 2011; Lever et al. 2013]. As a new area of research, it is still unclear how
different the challenges are between mobile malware detection and traditional malware detection
via network analysis. However, as shown in these studies, for bot-like behaviors and leaked data,
network analysis seems an effective method both traditional PCs and mobiles devices.
4.1.2. Application Programming Interfaces. APIs are a set of coherent methods for apps to interact
with the device. This includes app libraries in the Dalvik VM (same permissions as the app), and
unrestricted API implementations running in the system processes. For example, to modify a file, the
API is proxied by the public library API to the correct system process API implementation. Pegasus
[Chen et al. 2013], [Zheng et al. 2012], and Aurasium [Xu et al. 2012] dynamically monitor these
APIs for app policy enforcement and discovering UI triggers. Furthermore, if a private interface has
no corresponding public API, it can still be invoked with reflection — the ability an object has to
examine itself. Library and system APIs can also be studied in conjunction [Yan and Yin 2012], and
once extracted, APIs can also be used to classify malware, as shown in [Amamra et al. 2012].
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4.1.3. System Calls. System level APIs are highly dependent on the Android hardware, i.e. ARM.
The ARM ISA provides the swi instruction for invoking system calls. This causes a user-to-kernel
transition where a user-mode app accesses kernel-level system calls through local APIs. Once an
API is proxied to a system call and the system has verified the app’s permissions, the system
switches to kernel mode and uses system calls to execute tasks on behalf of the app. As apps can
only interact with the hardware via system calls, system call-centric analysis has been implemented
for Windows devices [Becher and Freiling 2008; Hwang et al. 2008] and Android devices [Burguera
et al. 2011; Grace et al. 2012; Tam et al. 2015b]. And while these are based on low level information,
it is still possible to reconstruct high level semantic behaviors using data from system call analysis.
4.1.4. Dependency Graphs. Dependency graphs provide a program method representation, with
each node a statement, and each edge a dependency between two statements. The manner in which
these edges are created determines the type of graph. For example, a data dependent edge exists if
the value of a variable in one state depends on another state. Once created, dependency graphs can
be analyzed for similarities such as plagiarism [Crussell et al. 2012]. Conversely, in control depen-
dency graphs, an edge exists if the execution trigger of one state depends on the value in another
state. For example, ScanDal [Kim et al. 2012] builds, and analyses, control flow graphs (CFG) based
on sensitive data returned by APIs to discover information leaks. Similarly, [Yajin Zhou 2013] also
uses CFGs to detect information leaks, but utilizes content providers instead of APIs. DroidSIFT
[Zhang et al. 2014], on the other hand, creates weighted, contextual, API dependency graphs to
construct feature sets. Using these features and graphs, DroidSIFT creates semantic signatures for
classifying Android malware. In comparison to feature API permission mapping, PScout [Au et al.
2012] combines all call graphs from the Android framework components for a full, flow-sensitive
analysis, and Pegasus [Chen et al. 2013] constructs permission event graphs to abstract the context
in which events fire. Multiple flow analysis can also be used together to search for malicious back-
ground actions [Felt et al. 2011; Grace et al. 2012]. To make these frameworks scalable, graphs must
remove all redundancies to avoid path explosions as more paths require more computations.
4.1.5. Features. Feature-based analysis extracts and studies sets of features from decompiled
apps in order to enforce policies, understand API permissions, and detect code reuse through feature
hashing (e.g., Juxtapp [Hanna et al. 2013]). To enforce security policies, hooks can be inserted at
key points for later dynamic monitoring [Backes et al. 2013; Davis et al. 2012]. Conversely, to iden-
tify which permissions an API requires, [Felt et al. 2011] ran different combinations of extracted
content providers and intents. Besides analyzing the actual feature, like which APIs were triggered,
feature frequency analysis is also often used to see how many times certain features are found, i.e.
multiple executions of the same API. The primary downside of feature-based analysis is it cannot
reveal the context (i.e., when, or how) in which a permission was triggered [Felt et al. 2011].
4.1.6. Function Call Monitoring. By dynamically intercepting function calls, such as library APIs,
frameworks can analyze both single calls and sequences of calls to reconstruct behaviors for se-
mantic representations, or monitor the function calls for misuse. Function hooks can also be used
to trigger additional analyses. For example, if a function was hooked and triggered, parameter anal-
ysis could then be applied to retrieve the parameter values of when the function was invoked. The
analysis framework InDroid inserted function call stubs at the start of each opcode’s interpretation
code in order to monitor bytecode execution and analyze Android behaviors. While it does require
modifications to the Dalvik VM and may not work on Android 5.0 (e.g., with ART), the method
requires relatively light modifications and has been used on versions 4.0-4.2 [Li et al. 2014].
4.1.7. Information Flow. Information flow is an essential analysis technique that tracks the trans-
fer of information throughout a system. While implemented for both traditional PCs and mobile
devices, it is important to note that flow analysis for Android differs greatly from traditional control
flow and data flow graphs. This is largely due to the fact that Android flow graphs are typically frag-
mented in real-world settings. This is inherently caused by Android app’s component-based nature
which allows components to be executed in an arbitrary order, depending on user interactions and
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system events. The biggest challenge for any information flow analysis on Android, therefore, is
to develop these graphs or data flows. One method to analyze information being moved, or copied,
to new locations is taint analysis. Hence traditional taint analysis has been frequently used to find
vulnerabilities in Windows [Kang et al. 2011]. Analyzing tainted data allows one to track how data
propagates throughout the program execution from a source (i.e., taint source) to a destination (i.e.,
taint sink). Taint sources create and attach taint labels to data leaving designated sources, such as
phone contacts. The system can then implement different taint propagation rules, i.e., tainting data
that come into contact with tainted data, during execution. Such rules include direct taint labels for
assignments or arithmetic operations, memory address dependent taints, and control flow taint de-
pendencies. When tainted data arrives at a sink, different procedures can then be run depending on
the data, source, and sink. Typically, taint analysis method is used to detect leaked data, like in Taint-
Droid and AndroidLeaks [Enck et al. 2010; Gibler et al. 2012]. Specifically, TaintDroid performs
dynamic taint analysis on application level messages and VM level variables, while AndroidLeaks
uses a mapping of API methods and permissions as the sources and sinks in a data-flow analysis.
Alternatively, FlowDroid [Arzt et al. 2014], implemented both object and flow-sensitive taint
analysis to consider the life-cycle of an Android app through control-flow graphs. While the graphs
provided context for which each methods belonged to, FlowDroid is, however, computationally
expensive and excludes network flow analysis. More recently, SUSI [Rasthofer et al. 2014], built
on Android v4.2, uses machine learning on used APIs, semantic features, and syntactic features, to
provide more source and sink information than both TaintDroid (Android v2.1) and SCanDroid.
Broadly speaking, information flows can be implicit, or explicit. In general, implicit information
flows (IIF) are more difficult to track than explicit. As a result, malware often leverage IIF to evade
detection while leaking data. In order to understand the types of IIFs within Android, [You et al.
2015] analyzed application Dalvik bytecode to identify indirect control transfer instructions. By
seeking various combinations of these instructions, the authors extrapolated five types of instruction-
based IIF and used them to bypass detection frameworks such as TaintDroid. Again, while these
techniques have been implemented in traditional PCs, this is one of the first attempts to apply them
to Android. In another taint analysis framework, the tools Dflow and DroidInfer were used in a
type-based taint analysis for both log flows and network flows [Huang et al. 2015]. Using the same
static decompiliation methods as FlowDroid (i.e., Soot and Dexpler), Dflow was used to understand
context sensitive information flows, and DroidInfer for type inference analysis. By tainting data as
safe, tainted, or poly (declared safe or tainted based on the context), the authors were able to detect
multiple information leaks (including ICC leaks), more so than related works such as FlowDroid.
4.1.8. Inter-Process Communications Analysis. Within the Android OS, apps rely on inter-
process communications (IPC) and remote procedure calls (RPC) to carry out most tasks. These
channels use Binder, a custom implementation of the OpenBinder protocol which allows Java pro-
cesses (e.g., apps) to use remote objects methods (e.g., services) as if they were local methods.
Thus analyzing IPC/RPC can provide essential Android-level insights. While CopperDroid [Tam
et al. 2015b] does this dynamically, there have been static methods tracking the movement of intents
within IPC, i.e. ICC [Li et al. 2015; Yang et al. 2015]. As data can be passed though various channels
like IPC, they are often analyzed for information flow. In one static study, Epicc [Octeau et al. 2013]
created and analyzed a control-flow super graph to detect ICC information leaks. While Epicc relied
on Soot for majority of its needs, Amandroid used a modified version of dexdump (i.e., dex2IR) to
study inter-component data flows [Wei et al. 2014]. Furthermore, while Epicc built control flow
graphs, Amandroid built data dependence graphs from each app’s ICC data flow graph. Amandroid
is also capable of more in depth analyses (e.g., libraries), which leads to a higher accuracy but at
a performance cost. Particularly for Android, analyzing ICC/IPC is essential for understanding and
detecting stealth behaviors [Huang et al. 2014] and leaked information [Li et al. 2015] as its IPC
Binder protocol is unique, a key part of the Android system, and much more powerful and complex
than most other IPC protocols. Furthermore, roughly 96% of 15,000 Android apps analyzed by [Li
et al. 2015] used IPC and malware noticeably leaked more data via IPC than benign apps.
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Table III. Android malware analysis techniques used by static and dynamic methods.
Network Traffic APIs System Calls Dependency Graphs Features
Dynamic
destination &
packets [Shabtai
et al. 2012; Bugiel
et al. 2011; Wei
et al. 2012b]
hooks etc. [Xu et al.
2012; Yan and Yin
2012]
[Burguera et al.
2011; Grace
et al. 2012;
Tam et al.
2015b]
[Anand et al. 2012;
Azim and Neamtiu
2013]
[Backes
et al. 2013;
Davis et al.
2012]
Static hard coded info
decompiling
[Amamra et al. 2012;
Arp et al. 2014; Chen
et al. 2013; Zheng
et al. 2012]
7
[Au et al. 2012; Kim
et al. 2012; Huang
et al. 2014; Yang et al.
2015; Mahmood et al.
2014]
[Hanna
et al. 2013;
Felt et al.
2011]
Function Call
Monitoring Taint IPC Hardware
Dynamic
[Li et al. 2014; Becher
and Freiling 2008;
Distefano et al. 2010; Xu
et al. 2012; Ravindranath
et al. 2012]
[Enck et al. 2010;
Gibler et al. 2012;
Enck et al. 2010]
[Tam et al. 2015b; Xu
et al. 2012; Ongtang
et al. 2009; Bugiel
et al. 2011]
[Kim et al. 2008;
Buennemeyer et al. 2008;
Nash et al. 2005; Jacoby
2004; Amos et al. 2013]
Static 7
[Yang et al. 2013;
Arzt et al. 2014;
Rasthofer et al.
2014; You et al.
2015]
[Yang et al. 2015;
Octeau et al. 2013; Li
et al. 2015; Wei et al.
2014]
Manifest [Arp et al. 2014]
4.1.9. Hardware Analysis. Several studies monitor the hardware status for abnormal behavior
through app power signatures [Kim et al. 2008] and power/CPU consumption [Buennemeyer et al.
2008; Nash et al. 2005; Jacoby 2004]. Since 2010 (see Fig. 4), most dynamic analyses that ex-
tracted hardware-based features also analyzed additional layers and features. Furthermore, since
devices like the camera can only be accessed by system calls, they are rarely analyzed on a hard-
ware level. The framework STREAM [Amos et al. 2013] collects data regarding system components
like cpuUser,cpuIdle, cpuSystem, memActive, and memMapped. STREAM gains this in-
formation via APIs from its own installed app, then subsequently uses machine learning algorithms
to train the system to detect Android malware. As mentioned previously, hardware components can
also be studied statically when analyzing the Android Manifest of an APK.
4.1.10. Android Application Metadata. Application market metadata is the information users see
prior to downloading and installing an app. Such data includes the app’s description, requested per-
missions, rating, and developer information. Since app metadata is not a part of the APK itself,
we do not categorize it as a static or dynamic feature. In WHYPER [Pandita et al. 2013], the app
permissions were acquired through the market and Natural Language Processing (NLP) was imple-
mented to determine why each permission was requested by parsing the app description. WHYPER
achieved 82.8% precision for three sensitive-data related permissions (address book, calendar and
record audio). Similarly, [Teufl et al. 2014] used sophisticated knowledge discovery process and
lean statistical methods to analyze Google Play metadata. Nonetheless, this study also stressed that
metadata analysis should be used in complement with other analyses. The app metadata they fed
to their machine learning algorithms included the last time modified, category (e.g., game), price,
description, permissions, rating, and number of downloads. Additional metadata included creator
ID (i.e., developer ID), contact email, contact website, promotional videos, number of screenshots,
promo texts, package name, installation size, version, and the app title.
4.2. Feature Selection
Choosing appropriate features is essential when conducting an analysis as it greatly determines the
effectiveness and accuracy of the research. As Android apps have many features to choose from,
there needs to be sound reasoning to why certain ones were chosen for certain experiments.
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4.2.1. Selection Reasoning. As mentioned previously, Android applications must be granted per-
missions in order to perform specific actions. Therefore, many studies such as VetDroid [Zhang et al.
2013] and DroidRanger [Zhou et al. 2012] analyze permission-usage because of this reasoning. Sim-
ilarly, DREBIN [Arp et al. 2014] analyzes intents, components, and APIs in addition to permissions
as they provide additional permission- and usage-based features for a more fine-grained results. One
method for feature selection, therefore, is understanding the Android system and hypothesized that
a set of features will provide the most reliable malware analysis or detection. Alternatively, new or
largely unused feature sets may be explored to confirm whether these hypotheses were correct or to
discover new, novel, solutions. Alternatively, feature ranking and selection algorithms may be used
to choose a subset of all available features
4.2.2. Feature Ranking Algorithms. Identifying the ideal feature set can be done with pre-existing
algorithms [Jensen and Shen 2008]. Such algorithms use various mathematical calculations to rank
all the possible features in the dataset. More details on datasets themselves can be found in Section
6. For example, the information gain algorithm has been widely used for feature selection, and is
based on the entropy difference between the cases utilizing, and not utilizing, certain features [Hyo-
Sik and Mi-Jung 2013]. One study, [Shabtai and Elovici 2010] used feature ranking algorithms to
select feature subsets from 88 features (i.e., top 10, 20 and 50). Comparably, [Shabtai et al. 2012]
analyzed the network traffic of Android apps and used selection algorithms to study the most useful
features. This step was essential due to the massive number of network traffic features to choose
from. Similarly, in [Yerima et al. 2014], the authors collected 2,285 Android apps and extracted over
22,000 features. Using selection algorithms, sets of the top features were then used for analysis.
4.3. Building on Analysis
Section 3 has provided a study on a diverse set of Android analysis approaches to obtain detailed
behavioral profiles [Enck et al. 2010; Zheng et al. 2012; Wei et al. 2012a; Au et al. 2012; Yan and
Yin 2012; Tam et al. 2015b; Anand et al. 2012; Wei et al. 2012b] and assess the malware threat [Felt
et al. 2011; Enck et al. 2011; Felt et al. 2011; Zhou and Jiang 2012b; Rastogi et al. 2013; Gomez et al.
2013; Zheng et al. 2013a; Jing et al. 2014]. These can be further developed to build classification
or clustering frameworks [Zhang et al. 2014; Schmidt et al. 2009a; Zhou and Jiang 2012b; Grace
et al. 2012; Rasthofer et al. 2014], policy frameworks [Ongtang et al. 2009; Distefano et al. 2010;
Dietz et al. 2011; Xu et al. 2012; Davis et al. 2012; Backes et al. 2013], and malware detectors. The
primary difference between classification and clustering, is that classification generally has a set of
predefined classes and the objective is to find which class a new object, or malware sample, belongs
to. Conversely, clustering groups unlabeled objects together by seeking similarities.
With these frameworks to build on top of, it is possible to detect Android malware [Sandeep Sarat
2007; Becher and Hund 2008; Schmidt et al. 2009a; Burguera et al. 2011; Shabtai et al. 2012], policy
violations such as information leaks [Bugiel et al. 2011; Kim et al. 2012; Yajin Zhou 2013], col-
luding apps [Marforio et al. 2012], and even repackaged or plagiarized apps [Crussell et al. 2012;
Zhou et al. 2012]. Most malware detection methods are either anomaly-based [Shabtai et al. 2012]
(e.g., defining normal and abnormal attribute sets), misuse-based [Yajin Zhou 2013] (e.g., identify-
ing specific malicious actions), or signature-based (e.g. semantic or bytecode) [Crussell et al. 2012].
Accurately defining “abnormal” and “malicious” becomes essential. Furthermore, once detected, it
is important to classify the threat for proper mitigation, family identification, and so new malware
(e.g., zero day malware [Grace et al. 2012]) can be dealt with properly.
With the increasing amount of malware each year, scalability and automated classifying (or clus-
tering) are also essential as malware flood app markets. In one study, it was shown that over 190
application markets host varied amounts of malware [Vidas and Christin 2013]. Traditionally, the
output of a classifier is either binary (i.e., the sample is either malicious or benign), or it is multi-
class (i.e., a sample can belong to one of many malware families or types). Furthermore, as classi-
fiers normally compute vectorial data, features for study must be mapped to a vector space that the
classifier can compute. Several general methods for inputing data into different classifiers include a
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binary representation, feature frequency, and by representing the states and/or transitions of a con-
trol or data flow graph. The difference between binary representation and feature frequency, is that
for binary representation, a 1 is used for features the samples have and 0 otherwise, while feature
frequency counts the number of times the feature was seen in a sample.
One of the more popular classifiers used for Android malware has been support vector machines,
but many more are available (e.g., decision trees, naive bayes, kNN, random forest) and should be
explored to find the most suitable fit to the features and desired task. In terms of scalability, manual
efforts [Zhou and Jiang 2012b] will not scale, and sometimes accuracy is sacrificed for scalability
(see Section 6). To keep accuracy high but improve its scalability, different filters or simplification
methods can be used. For instance, DNADroid [Crussell et al. 2012] implemented several filters on
their graphs to automatically reduce the search space and improve scalability with little cost.
5. EVOLUTION OF MALWARE TACTICS
As mentioned throughout the paper, there are several kinds of obfuscation and VM-detection meth-
ods used by both traditional and mobile malware to obstruct analysis. In this paper, we place static
obfuscation techniques into several tiers; trivial transformations, transformations that hinder static
analysis, and transformations that can prevent static analysis (e.g., anti-disassembly).
5.1. Trivial Layout Transformations
Trivial transformations require no code or bytecode level changes and mainly deter signature-based
analysis. Unique to the Android framework, unzipping and repackaging APK files is a trivial form
of obfuscation that does not modify any data in the manifest. This is because when repackaging the
new app, it is signed with custom keys instead of the original developer’s keys. Therefore, signa-
tures created with the developer keys, or the original app’s checksum, would be rendered ineffective,
allowing an attacker to easily distribute seemingly legitimate applications with different signatures.
Android APK dex files may also be decompiled, as previously shown in Fig. 3(a), and reassembled.
We are unaware of any studies decompiling ART oat or odex files as of early 2015. Once disas-
sembled, components may be re-arranged, or their representations altered. Like repackaging, this
obfuscation technique also changes the layout of the app, which primarily breaks signatures based
on the order, or number, of items within the dex file in an APK.
5.2. Transformations that Complicate Static Analysis
While some static techniques are resilient to obfuscations, each technique is vulnerable to a specific
obfuscation method. Specifically, what we have classified as feature based, graph based, and struc-
ture based static analysis, can overcome some of these transformations, but be broken by others. For
example, feature based analysis is generally vulnerable against data obfuscation and, depending on
its construction, structural analysis is vulnerable to layout, data, and control obfuscation.
5.2.1. Data Obfuscation. This method alters APK data, such as the Manifest’s package name.
Renaming app methods, classes, and field identifiers with tools like ProGuard is one method of
data obfuscation. Instance variables, methods, payloads, native code, strings, and arrays can also be
reordered and/or encrypted within the dex file, disrupting most signature methods and several static
techniques as well. In Android, native code (i.e., C or C++ code compiled to run with a specific
processor) is normally accessed via the Java native interface (JNI), but malicious encrypted native
exploits can also be stored within the APK itself. Furthermore, in the cases where the source code is
available, the bytecode can be altered by changing variables from local to global, converting static
data to procedural data, changing variable types, and splitting or merging data such as arrays and
strings. Similar forms of obfuscation have roots in traditional PC practices [Collberg et al. 1997].
5.2.2. Control Flow Obfuscation. This method deters call-graph analysis with call indirections:
moving method calls without altering semantics. For example, a method can be moved to a previ-
ously non-existent method which then calls the original method. Alternatively, code reordering also
obfuscates an application’s flow. Programming languages are also often compiled into more expres-
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sive language, such as virtual machine code. This is the case with Java, as Java bytecode possesses
the goto instruction while normal Java does not. Bytecode instructions can then be scrambled with
goto instructions inserted to preserve runtime execution.
Other obfuscation transformations include injecting dead or irrelevant code sequences, adding
arbitrary variable checks, loop transformations (i.e., unrolling), and function inlining/outlining, as
they often add misdirecting graph states and edges. Function inlining, the breaking of functions into
multiple smaller functions, can be combined with call indirections to generate stronger obfuscation.
Alternatively, functions can be joined (i.e., outlining) and Android class methods can be combined
by merging their bodies, methods, and parameters This is known as interweaving classes. Lastly,
Android allows for a few unique transformations by renaming or modifying non-code files and
stripping away debug data (i.e., anti-debugging), such as source file names, source file line numbers,
and local parameters [Rastogi et al. 2013].
5.3. Transformations that Prevent Static Analysis
These transformations have long been the downfall of static analysis frameworks for traditional
analyses [Moser et al. 2007] and mobile malware analysis [Rastogi et al. 2013; Hoffmann et al.
2013]. Unless also a hybrid solution, no static framework can fully analyze Android applications
using full bytecode encryption or Java reflection. Bytecode encryption encrypts all relevant pieces
of the app and is only decrypted at runtime: without the decryption routine, the app is unusable. This
is popular with traditional polymorphic viruses that also heavily obfuscate the decryption routine.
For Android APKs, the bulk of essential code would be stored in an encrypted dex, or odex, file
that can only be decrypted and loaded dynamically through a user-defined class loader. Reflection for
Android apps can also be used to access all of an API library’s hidden and private classes, methods,
and fields. This is possible as Java reflection allows objects to examine and modify itself. Thus,
by converting any method call to a reflective call with the same function, it becomes difficult to
discover exactly which method was called. Moreover, encrypting that method’s name would make
statically analyzing it impossible. Cryptography, another useful tool for obfuscation, can be used by
the app developer prior installation or at run-time with the use of Android crypto APIs.
Similarly, the use of dynamically-loaded code cannot be analyzed statically and may difficult
to analyze dynamically, depending on the technique. This mechanism loads a library into memory
at run-time, hence the static difficulties, in order to retrieve the addresses of library functions and
variables. Functions can then be executed to achieve the desired effect. While utilizing libraries my
be a benign action, dynamically loading code is a practical and effective form of obfuscation.
5.4. Anti-Analysis and VM-Aware
With the rapid growth of Android malware, sophisticated anti-analysis RATs (i.e., remote access
trojans) such as Obad, Pincer, and DenDroid, are detecting and evading emulated environments
by identifying missing hardware and phone identifiers. More sophisticated anti-analysis methods
include app collusion (willingly or blindly), requiring user input, and timing attacks like QEMU
scheduling (i.e., measuring emulated scheduling behaviors), all of which have been implemented by
[Petsas et al. 2014] to evade cutting-edge detection tools. DenDroid, a real-world Trojan discovered
in 2014, is capable of many malicious behaviors, but will not exhibit them if it detects emulated
environments such as Google Bouncer [Dilger 2014]. Another malware family, AnserverBot, detects
and stops on-device mobile anti-virus software by randomly restarting their processes. The malware
Android.hehe also has split-personality and acts benignly when the device IDs (e.g., IMEI) and
Build strings indicate that it is running in an emulated environment [Hitesh 2014].
Other ways to deter analysis, but not necessarily detect VMs, is to make the app UI intensive,
execute at “odd” times (i.e., midnight or a day after installation), require network, or require the
presence of another app. For example, the malware CrazyBirds will only execute if the application
AngryBirds had also been installed and played with at least once. Additional obfuscation methods to
deter dynamic analysis are data obfuscation (e.g., encryption), misleading information flows (e.g.,
[You et al. 2015]), mimicry, and function indirections.
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5.5. Statistics for Android Malware Evolution
In this subsection we present our study on how Android malware has evolved to avoid analysis and
as a threat in terms of permissions from 2010 onwards to late 2014. Our 2010-2012 dataset is made
of 5,560 Android malware samples provided by the Drebin project [Arp et al. 2014], including
those previously studied in the Android Malware Genome Project [Zhou and Jiang 2012a]. The
older dataset comes from a live telemetry of more than 3,800 Android malware — 704 samples
in 2012, 1,925 in 2013, and 1,265 in 2014 — that were detected in the wild by a well-established
AV vendor2. The analysis itself was primarily based on the Androguard tool [Desnosi and Gueguen
2012]. Thus our script could compile data on how many malware in our dataset used techniques like
native code (i.e., is native code) from 2010 to 2015.
Android Malware Obfuscation: Overall, we automatically analyzed more than 9,300 Android
malware samples to understand how the malware threat evolved in terms of used dynamically-
loaded code, Java reflection, native code invocation, crypto APIs, and top used permissions. Table
IV shows the permission rankings found in our analyses. We then examined the implication of such
trends on the state-of-the-art techniques and how it influences future research. To date, a great deal
of static analysis methods have been created to understand, and mitigate, Android malware threats.
However, trends show an increase in the usage of dynamically-loaded code and Java reflection,
as depicted in Fig. 6. Such features hinder the effectiveness of static analysis and call for further
research on robust hybrid or dynamic analysis development [Zhang et al. 2013; Yan and Yin 2012].
Although dynamic analysis is more robust against the use of dynamically-loaded code and Java
reflection, its effectiveness is often reduced by its limited code coverage. Recent works, such as
[Anand et al. 2012; Vidas et al. 2014; Gianazza et al. 2014], have begun to address this particular
limitation, and it is clear that further research is needed to provide effective and efficient solutions
(further discussions in Section 6). Similarly, Fig. 6 shows a constant increase in the use of native
code, which calls for further research in the development of techniques able to transparently analyze
low-level semantics as well as high-level Android semantic seamlessly [Tam et al. 2015b].
Permission Usage and Malware Threat: Shifting to permission usage within our dataset, a
reasonable indicator of the growing influence (i.e., threat) of malware, the INTERNET permission
was the most requested, followed by READ PHONE STATE (e.g., access to IMEI, IMSI, phone
number). As seen in Table IV, their popularity has fluctuated a few positions the first few years,
but eventually stabilized. Furthermore, even though 82% of all apps read device ID and 50% collect
Fig. 6. Evolution of Android malware using dynamically-loaded code, native code invocations, reflection, and crypto APIs.
2Due to confidentiality agreements, we cannot redistribute Android malware samples provided by the McAfee AV vendor,
but we can share their metadata to allow samples’ lookups and replicate our findings.
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Table IV. Rank variations of top 10 Android permission requests from 2010 to 2014.
Permission Ranking 2010-2011 Permission Ranking 2012
R1. INTERNET (96.6%) R1. INTERNET (97%)
R2. READ PHONE STATE (90.5%) R2. (+3) ACCESS NETWORK STATE (92%)
R3. VIBRATE (67%) R3. VIBRATE (89%)
R4. WRITE EXTERNAL STORAGE (67.2%) R4. (+6) ACCESS FINE LOCATION (84.5%)
R5. ACCESS NETWORK STATE (67.2%) R5. (-3) READ PHONE STATE (90.5%)
R6. SEND SMS (58.11%) R6. (+1) WAKE LOCK (80.9%)
R7. WAKE LOCK (50%) R7. (+2) ACCESS WIFI STATE (59%)
R8. RECEIVE BOOT COMPLETED (48%) R8. (-4) WRITE EXTERNAL STORAGE (67.2%)
R9. ACCESS WIFI STATE (46.6%) R9. (+5) ACCESS CO* LOCATION (48%)
R10. ACCESS FINE LOCATION (43%) R10. (+8) FACTORY TEST (40.9%)
Permission Ranking 2013 Permission Ranking 2014
R1. INTERNET (97.7%) R1. INTERNET (98.7%)
R2. ACCESS NETWORK STATE (95.6%) R2. ACCESS NETWORK STATE (98.3%)
R3. (+2) READ PHONE STATE (94.2%) R.3 READ PHONE STATE (96.2%)
R4. (-1) VIBRATE (92.6%) R4. VIBRATE (93.7%)
R5. (+2) ACCESS WIFI STATE (88.6%) R5. (+1) WAKE LOCK (92.5%)
R6. WAKE LOCK (85.9%) R6. (-1) ACCESS WIFI STATE (92.1%)
R7. (-3) ACCESS FINE LOCATION (82.1%) R7. ACCESS FINE LOCATION (86.8%)
R8. WRITE EXTERNAL STORAGE (70.6%) R8. (+1) FACTORY TEST (81.6%)
R9. (+1) FACTORY TEST (67.2%) R9. (-1) WRITE EXTERNAL STORAGE (78.8%)
R10. (-1) ACCESS COARSE LOCATION (57%) R10. ACCESS CO* LOCATION (63.7%)
physical locations, malware are even more likely to gather such data. For example, malware are eight
times more likely to steal SIM card data [McAfee 2014]. There are many ways to misuse this leaked
user information, such as determining the user’s location and differentiating between real devices
and emulators (details in Section 6). To collect geographical data, the malware we analyzed became
increasingly interested in location based permissions (COARSE and FINE as seen in Table IV). We
also noted the prevalence of the SEND SMS permission, although it lessened over the years due to
Google’s efforts and thus omitted from Table IV. Despite this, it was found that SMS malware have
increased over three times since 2012, are a top concern in the US, Spain, and Taiwan, and can both
generate revenue for attackers and steal bank SMS tokens to hack bank accounts [McAfee 2014].
In Table IV, the number of Android malware requesting WRITE SETTINGS permission was
relatively low in 2010 (8.5%), but the number rocketed up to 20.38% in 2014. There was also a
similar increase in READ SETTINGS, and while benign apps only ask for this permission pair
0.2% of the time, malware do so 11.94% of the time [Lindorfer et al. 2014]. Another drastic change
was with the SYSTEM ALERT WINDOW permission (i.e., allows an app to open a window on top
of other apps) being requested only by 0.23% of malware in 2010, but by 24.8% in 2014. Granting
this permission can be very dangerous as malware can deny services to open apps and attempt to
trick users into clicking ads, install software, visit vulnerable sites, and other similar actions.
We also witnessed several new permissions being requested across these years. As an exam-
ple, the dangerous permission MOUNT FORMAT FILESYSTEMS (i.e., used to format an exter-
nal memory card), was first used by three malware in 2011. Other permissions starting to become
popular with malware include USE CREDENTIALS and AUTHENTICATE ACCOUNTS, which
were categorized as dangerous by Google as they could greatly aid in privilege escalation. IN-
STALL PACKAGES, added in 2011, is another dangerous permission, as it allows malware to in-
stall other packages to gain more privileges, spread the infection, or make it harder to eradicate.
Partly due to the introduction of more dangerous permissions3 the percentage of malware in our
dataset requesting such permissions increased from 69% in 2010 to 79% by 2014. Again, this may
be the result of malware seeking more control and access over their environment, but may also
reflect precarious changes in the permission system. As discussed later on, other studies on the An-
droid permission system evolution have also shown it growing larger, more coarse grained, and with
a higher percentage of dangerous permissions.
3Google maintains a list of dangerous permissions at http://developer.android.com/guide/topics/security/permissions.html.
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6. DISCUSSION
Smartphones are currently the top, personal, computing device and trends show that this is unlikely
to change with over 2.5 billion mobile shipments made by early 2015 [Gartner 2015]. Of these
shipped smartphones, Android is by far the most popular smartphone OS and has attracted a growing
number of dangerous malware [Securelist 2013; McAfee 2015].
To better understand the current malware threat, we use this survey on Android malware analy-
sis and detection methods to assess their effectiveness. We then suggest the next logical steps for
future research against malware and make a few general observations. For example, it is clear from
previous studies that the Android permission system is not becoming more fine-grained, and that
the number of dangerous permissions is still increasing. Although it is also apparent that malware
is taking advantage of this situation, it is not clear what needs to be improved. While the permission
system does provide flexibility and allow users to be more involved in security decisions, it has de-
volved the responsibility of securing Android and its users. Therefore, while it is important to create
accurate and reliable malware analysis and detection, which we have discussed extensively, knowing
which flaws need to be repaired by which party (e.g., users or manufacturer) is also essential.
6.1. Impact and Motivation
With developing mobile technologies and a shift towards profit-driven malware, the research com-
munity has striven to (1) understand, and improve, mobile security, (2) assess malware risks, and (3)
evaluate existing analysis frameworks and anti-virus solutions. By amassing and analyzing various
Android malware techniques and Android malware analysis frameworks, this article has identified
several risks that should motivate continuous research efforts in certain directions. These research
directions are discussed further on, after assessing today’s mobile security effectiveness.
6.1.1. Malware Growth and Infections. Despite encouraging trends in Android malware detection
and mitigation, we feel that mobile malware — Android in particular — is still growing in sophis-
tication and more challenging problems lie ahead. We also believe that these threats and infections,
although not spread evenly across countries, is a global threat. Even with low infection rates in some
countries, if the right devices are compromised, a much larger number of individuals can still be neg-
atively affected. As a recap, despite low Android malware infections in some geographical areas like
the USA [Securelist 2013; Lever et al. 2013], the overall global infection rate is more concerning.
For example, [Truong et al. 2013] has estimated a 26-28% infection rate world wide based on real
device data, and McAfee has estimated a 6%-10% infection rate using Android devices running
their security solutions. Like biological viruses, it is also dangerous to ignore developing malware
families in other app markets or countries, as there may be future cross infection. Furthermore,
when considering that the majority of new malware are undetected by antivirus products, discussed
further below, it is highly plausible that actual infection rates are higher than reported. To reduce
malware infections, malware markets need to be able to both accurately vet submitted applications,
and remove available malware as soon as they have been identified or detected by themselves or by
an external party. Ideally, users should also be encouraged to download apps from a central, offi-
cial, market that rigorously checks its applications. However, third-party markets are sometimes the
only source of applications in some locations. Online application malware and virus detectors and
on-device detectors can then be used by users to lower infections rates in these cases.
Privilege escalating root exploits for Android are also easily available 74%-100% of a device’s
life time [Felt et al. 2011]. While only one known malware sample attacked rooted phones in 2011,
by the following year, more than a third the malware analyzed by [Zhou and Jiang 2012b] leveraged
root exploits. Furthermore, more than 90% of rooted phones were surrendered to a botnet, which is
a significant amount as 15%-20% of all Android devices were rooted at that time. Built-in support
for background SMS to premium numbers was also found in 45%-50% [La Polla et al. 2013; Felt
et al. 2011] of the samples, and user information harvesting, a top security issue in 2011 [Felt et al.
2011], is still a current issue with 51% of malware samples exhibiting this behavior [McAfee 2014].
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6.1.2. Weaknesses in Analysis Frameworks. Many frameworks today are unable to analyze dy-
namically loaded code and are susceptible to at least one kind of obfuscation (see Tables V and
VI). This is significant and within our own experiments in Section 5, we have shown the growing
correlation between current malware and the use of reflection, native code based attacks, and dynam-
ically loaded code based attacks. Methods for dynamic code loading within Android include class
loaders, package content, the runtime Java class, installing APKs (i.e., piggy-back attack, drive-by-
downloads), and native code. Malware often use these methods to run root exploits. Furthermore,
even when used benignly, dynamically loaded code has caused widespread vulnerabilities [Poe-
plau et al. 2014; Fedler et al. 2013]. In 2014, an attack against the Android In-app Billing was
launched using dynamically loaded code and was successful against 60% of the top 85 Android
apps [Mulliner et al. 2014]. Native based attacks can also be used on at least 30% of the million
apps Andrubis analyzed as they were vulnerable to web-based attacks by exposing native Java ob-
jects [Lindorfer et al. 2014]. Despite this, as can be seen in Tables V and VI (pages 25-26), many
frameworks exclude native code and dynamically loaded code in their analyses. Similarly, as seen in
these tables, static obfuscation is often the cause of incorrect static results and sometimes prevents
the complete analysis of a subset of analyzed malware (e.g., failed during decompiling).
6.1.3. Weaknesses in AV Products. To evaluate AV products, [Zhou and Jiang 2012b] tested four
AV systems in 2012. The best and worst detection rates were 79.6% and 20% respectively, but the
most current and advanced malware families were completely undetected. As shown in Section 5,
signature-based AV products can be broken by the simplest transformations, and dynamic code can
be used to evade dynamic systems, such as Google Bouncer [Poeplau et al. 2014]. Unfortunately, the
inner workings of Google Bouncer and similar systems are not available, but can still be evaluated.
In 2013, DroidChameleon [Rastogi et al. 2013] submitted automatically obfuscated Android apps
to ten popular AV products and found all ten vulnerable to trivial transformations, the lowest of the
three transformations “tiers”. Approximately 86% of apps also use repackaging [Zhou and Jiang
2012b]. This is significant as at least 43% of the malware signatures are not based on code-level
artifacts and can therefore be broken with trivial transformations on the APK or Manifest.
If malware alter class names, methods, files, or string/array data within the dex file (i.e., second
tier obfuscation), they can deter 90% of popular AV products [Rastogi et al. 2013]. Half of Android
apps also use Java reflection to access API calls, which is a top tier obfuscation method [Felt et al.
2011]. In 2012, ADAM [Zheng et al. 2013a] showed results similar to DroidChameleon even when
analyzing a different set of AV products. Specifically, ADAM stress tested their top 10 AV products
by repackaging malware and found that the detection rate lowered by roughly 10%. Interestingly,
middle tier obfuscation (e.g., renaming, altering control flow, string encryption) successfully low-
ered detection rates further from 16.5% to 42.8%, implying that higher tiered obfuscations are more
successful. Furthermore, despite improvements in the AV products’ detection rate due to consistent,
rigorous, signature updating, as malware shift to stronger obfuscations, this cannot be sustained;
one year after ADAM, [Vidas and Christin 2013] found that AV detection rates fell to 0-32%.
The framework AndroTotal [Maggi et al. 2013], can also be used to analyze a malware with mul-
tiple mobile AV products to compare their results. In 2014, Morpheus [Kazdagli et al. 2014] used
static and dynamic techniques to create a wide range of malware for benchmarking computational
diversity in mobile malware. Although they have not yet tested them on any AV products or analy-
sis frameworks, such an experiment could be very enlightening. In summary, multiple studies have
tested the top AV systems and found them lacking at all levels of transformations attacks. Further-
more, higher tiered transformations, namely Java reflection and native code (61% and 6.3% of apps
studied by Stowaway [Felt et al. 2011]), are significantly more successful than lower tiers [Maiorca
et al. 2015]. Besides being heavily obfuscated against static analysis, sophisticated malware is also
bypassing dynamic analyses like Google Bouncer by detecting emulated environments.
6.1.4. Lack of Representative Datasets. Every Android analysis, detection, and classification sys-
tem should be evaluated on a dataset of Android app samples, benign and/or malicious. Initially,
even a few years after the first Android malware was discovered in 2010 [Lookout 2010], researchers
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lacked a solid, standard dataset to work with. Many instead wrote their own malware to assess their
systems [Shabtai et al. 2012]. Other collected and shared samples with website crawlers, such as
Contagio [Contagio 2014]. These approaches, however, yielded limited datasets, hindering thor-
ough system evaluations. In 2012, the MalGenome project [Zhou and Jiang 2012b] attempted to fix
that as it contained 1260 malware samples categorized into 49 different malware families and was
collected from August 2010 to October 2011. Later that year, at least four notable research projects
had used the MalGenome dataset, and in 2013 the number increased by three-fold.
However, based on the rapidly evolving nature of Android malware, it is essential to update the
dataset with newer samples to continue testing systems effectively. This, in part, was satisfied with
DREBIN [Arp et al. 2014], a collection of 5,560 malware from 179 different families collected
between August 2010 and October 2012, but considering the continuing increase in malware (400%
from 2012 to 2013 [Symantec 2013]), and all the new sophisticated malware after 2012 (e.g., Old-
boot, Android.HeHe), a more complete and up to date dataset is necessary [McAfee 2014; 2013].
For reasons we will explain further on in this section, it is also essential to have a diverse dataset
with samples from a range of years, app categories, popularity, markets, among others.
6.1.5. IoT. One interesting point of discussion is the Internet of things (IoT), the concept that
everything from keys to kitchen appliances will be connected via the Internet. This poses many
interesting possibilities, as well as security concerns, as there is a high likelihood that a growing
IoT will adopt a simple, open-source, popular, reasonably sized OS, such as Android. Therefore,
reliable and portable Android analysis frameworks may be even more essential. For example, there
are already several smart TVs and watches powered by Android (i.e., Android Wear watches that
communicate with the user’s phone) on the market for public consumption. Efforts have also been
made to adopt the Android operating system for satellites, espresso makers, game controllers, and
refrigerators [Vance 2013]. If the IoT were to adopt smaller, altered versions of the Android OS, it
would give researchers an incentive to create portable analysis and detection tools so they may be
usable across all Android OS versions no matter what device it powers. This added security would
be even more effective, if done in conjunction with improved application market vetting methods.
6.2. Mobile Security Effectiveness
To evaluate the present status of Android malware analysis and detection frameworks, this article
provides Tables V and VI. These provide details on framework methods (e.g., static or dynamic),
sample selection process, scalability, accuracy, and sturdiness.
6.2.1. Analyzed Datasets. As mentioned previously in Section 4, sample selection is essential
as different markets, social circles, and geographic locations are often infected by different mal-
ware and in different amounts [Zhou et al. 2012; Juniper 2013; Securelist 2013; Lever et al. 2013;
McAfee 2014]. Despite this, many studies only use one app source and either choose several apps
per category (e.g., games, business) or select apps that best suit their research needs (see Tables V
and VI). For example, SmartDroid [Zheng et al. 2012] chose a small set of malware triggered by
UI to test its system specifically for revealing UI-based triggers. Ideally, however, malware samples
should be chosen from several families, to provide a more diverse set of behaviors, including eva-
sion techniques, to test the system with. Hence, for most cases, a diverse, representative dataset is
desired. In actuality, however, obtaining a truly representative dataset can be a real challenge.
AppProfiler [Rosen et al. 2013] discovered that popular Google Play apps exhibited more be-
haviors, and were more likely to monitor the hardware, than an average app. This is significant as
many studies, such as VetDroid, I-ARM-DROID, and ScanDal, only analyzed popular apps. While
a dataset of only free, popular apps may provide more malicious behaviors to analyze, the selection
would not be a reasonable representation of the Android markets as a whole. Similarly, a significant
number of studies only analyze free apps, but as ProfileDroid established, paid apps behaved very
differently than their free counterparts. For example, free apps processed an order of a magnitude
more network traffic. It could be argued that popular apps affect more users and are therefore more
essential for research. However, the difference between free/paid samples should be at least con-
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Table V. Android malware analysis frameworks; Superscript “m” for malicious, “b” for benign, “GP” for Google Play
Year Framework Method Samples Sample Selection Scalable Sturdiness
2012 Aurasium[Xuet al. 2012]
sandbox (dynamic)
detect API misuse
3rd
party
3491
b
(99.6% detect),
1260
m
(99.8% detect)
low
overhead
7 native code, java refl.
7 sandbox transparency
2012 PScout[Auet al. 2012]
perm. spec. from OS
source code & APK +
stim. (UI fuzzing)
GP 1,260 chosen for APIcoverage -
7 unfeasible paths = false
mappings
2012
AppGuard
[Backes
et al. 2013]
app rewriter + dynamic
inline ref. monitoring +
stimulation
GP,
SlideMe
25,000 apps tested for
robustness
(stimulation)
low
overhead
7 no callee-site rewriting
3 java refl., dy. loaded code
2012
DroidScope
[Yan and
Yin 2012]
dynamic + virt. +
reconstruct OS &
Java-level semantics
GP
7 bench. (efficiency &
capability) + 2
m
taint 11x-
34x
slow↓
3 Java, JNI, ELF
7 limited code coverage
2012
I-ARM-
DROID[Davis
et al. 2012]
statically add stubs to
use correct perm./APIs GP
30 random from top
100 free apps
size+2%
+110 ms
7 native code
3 API reflection
2012
SmartDroid
[Zheng et al.
2012]
statically find activity
paths + dynamic to find
triggers
- 19 wild apps (7 fam.)w/ UI triggered mal.
6/7 <1.5
mins
7 native code
7 cannot reveal hidden UI
2013
CopperDroid
[Tam et al.
2015b]
VM-based dynamic
analysis + stimulation
several
sources
1,200
m
(49 families)
400
m
(13 families)
v10min/
app
3 Java, JNI, ELF
3 v 25% more behaviors
2013
Jin et. al [Jin
and Wang
2013]
software-defined
network traffic
monitoring
- 4 mobiles 100 IPs
v746k
respon-
se/sec
7 encrypted traffic
3 monitors traffic from all
OSs
2013
ContentScope
[Yajin Zhou
2013]
static path-sensitive
data-flow + dynamic
exec confirmation +
classify leak/pollution
markets
(mult.)
62,519 apps (3,018
vul.) from Feb. 2012 -
7 false +’s (static & start er-
rors)
7 manual classification
2013 Contest[Anandet al. 2012]
concolic app testing
(generate event
sequence for auto. tests)
- 5 open-source apps vhour/app 3 lessens path explosion
7 only handles tap events
2013
Droid Ana-
lytics[Zheng
et al. 2013b]
multi-lvl (method,
class, payload) op code
signatures (static)
markets,
web
148kb 2km (234
families)
v70sec/
app
3 repackaged code obfusca-
tion
7 logic obfuscation
2013 Pegasus[Chenet al. 2013]
static + runtime policy
monitoring +
API/permission event
graphs
- 152
m
, 117
b
80%
0.5hrs,
max
5.6hrs
3 captures event fire context
7 detects obfu but still vuln.
2013
ProfileDroid
[Wei et al.
2012b]
static + multi-layer
dynamic (UI, system
calls, network)
GP
27 varied apps (8
pairs of paid/free
apps)
10 (5
min)
runs/app
3 diverse run environments
7 not scalable
2013
SAAF
[Hoffmann
et al. 2013]
static (smali) auto and
optional manual GP free apps: 136k
b
, 6k
m <10 sec/
app
7 reflection (no backtrack)
7 runtime info (native code)
2013
VetDroid
[Zhang et al.
2013]
dynamic permission
usage + reconstruct
fine-grained actions
GP
32 categories top
1.2k
b
apps
2min/ app — slow↓ 32% on device
7 native code, java code
2014
Rasthofer et
al.[Rasthofer
et al. 2014]
dy + taint + machine
learning + API feat.
Virus
Share
11k
m
apps with API
data leaks
SVN,
QP-prob.
3 supports all Android OSs
— not tested w/ obfuscation
2014 RiskMon[Jinget al. 2014]
dy+machine learn+ API
monitor + interpose IPC GP
14 mostly popular &
at least 2 were free
0.55s/
app
7 colluding apps
7 non-binder comms
2014 [Poeplauet al. 2014]
edit DVM + control
flow graph (method) +
dyn. code loading
GP popular free 1.6k2012-Aug 2013
relies on
white list
7 code executed in default app
config
7 custom integrity checks
2014 A5[Vidaset al. 2014]
static execution paths
via Activities + dy.
network ID sigs.
public
source 1,260 malicious apps
avg.
149s/app
3 attempts vm transparency
7 dynamically loaded intents
2015
DroidSafe
[Gordon
et al. 2015]
static information flow
+ hooks + calls that
start activities
real-
world
apps
24 modified apps for
hooking
<222s
per
analysis
3 avoid irrelevant classes
7 dynamically loaded code
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Table VI. Android malware detection frameworks; Superscripts “m” malicious, “b” benign, and “P” for Google Play
Year Framework Method #Apps
Sample
Selection Result
False
+/-
Scal-
able Sturdiness
2011
Andromaly
[Shabtai
et al. 2012]
machine learn +
real- time monitor
hardware
4
maliciously
self-
developed
detect all
malware
low/
?
perf.
10% ↓ 7 misses ”quick” actions
2011
Crowdroid
[Burguera
et al. 2011]
dynamic system
call logs +
k-means cluster
5 3-developed,2-real
100%-self,
93%-real
Yes/
-
NP-
hard
7 needs cloud connection
— scalable in comparison
2012
Droid
MOSS [Ya-
jin Zhou
2013]
fuzzy hash +
static sigs +
dynamic
comparison
200
random (6
world
markets)
5%-13%
repack-
aged
10%/
10% -
7 assumes legit apps
7 incomplete list of shared
libs
2012
RiskRanker
[Grace
et al. 2012]
study native code,
encryption,
dynamic code
loading
118k
mult.
markets (end
2011), 29
families
detect 322
zero-day
malware
Yes
(?/?)
all in 4
days
7 downloaded exploits
7 tests small behavior set
7 obfuscation/encryption
2012
ScanDal
[Kim et al.
2012]
static + sensitive
APIs +
sources/sinks
90
9 free pop,
random type
July’11
detect 11
leaks
18%
/?
83s-
49m
3 simple reflection
7 native code, refl., obf.
2012
DroidMat
[Wu et al.
2012]
static + perms &
API +
components
238
m
1500
b
Contagio&GP
(50
b
apps)
quick and
accurate
detection
0.4%/
12.6% Y
3 50% faster than Androguard
7 native code, refl., obf.
2013
AppIntent
[Yang
et al. 2013]
static + symbolic
exec. +
event-space
reduction
1750 1000
b
GP
750
m
detect 582,
sym. 358
164/
low
symb.
<2hrs
3 see user vs. background
7 native code
2013
AppProfiler
[Rosen
et al. 2013]
static + map API
to behavior 80k
15 diverse &
popular apps
detect
v59%
behaviors
16%/
15%
500 a/
day
3 see user vs. background
7 obfu. class/pkg names, na-
tive code
2013
MAMA
[Sanz et al.
2013]
extract Manifest
features +
machine learning
333
m
333
b
max
coverage /
diversity,
2011
best
detects
94%
best
5%
/?
- 3 wide app coverage
7 Internet/piggy payloads
2013
PiggyApp
[Zhou
et al. 2013]
feature fingerprint
(perm., API) +
feature vectors
84,
767
6 markets +
GP + free
apps
0.97%-
2.7%
piggyback
4.5%
/?
0.952
s/app
3 obfuscation
7 no syntactic sequences
2014
AppSealer
[Zhang
and Yin
2013]
static bytecode +
program slices 16
vulnerable
apps
patch vul
apps
0%/
?
most
<60s
3 device shadowing/patches
— app size +16-45%
— app slowdown 2%
2014
Droid
Barrier
[Almohri
et al. 2014]
hidden shells w/
own proc. +
credentials
v
400
m 3 malware
fams
36.7% use
hidden
shell
-
preform.
penalty
<13%
3 isolated in kernel mode
7 kernel level & embedded at-
tacks
2014
Apposcopy
[Feng et al.
2014]
static
taint+control/
data
flow+semantic sig
1k
m
8k
P
in the 8k
there were
6
m
classify
family
10%/
0.2%
not
instant
3 low level obfuscation
7 native code
2014
AsDroid
[Huang
et al. 2014]
static dex to jar +
intent propaga-
tion/correlation +
ICC call chains
128
free pop.
apps (GP,
Contagio,
3rd Party)
model
stealthy
behaviors
28% /
11%
7 flow obfu., native code, refl.
7 only textual UI
2014
DroidInfer
[Huang
et al. 2015]
static + jimple +
taint analysis w
context
22
m
144
b
39
free pop.
apps (GP,
Contagio,
DroidBench)
data flow
in logs &
network
16%/
-
v2
mins
— partial ICC flows
— +2GB, edits libraries
3 Does well with DroidBench
2015
AppContext
[Yang
et al. 2015]
Soot + Dexpler +
Extended call
graphs
202
m
633
b GP
context-
based
detection
v12%
/ 5%
— some dynamic code, refl.
7 Pscout’s drawbacks (relies
on Pscout mappings)
sidered when choosing a dataset. Furthermore, applications selected from markets should represent
several categories, as each category entails a unique functionality and set of behaviors for study.
In the future, up-to-date datasets should continue to be expanded by incorporating new samples
from multiple sources to provide more globally representative, and diverse, datasets. If used cor-
rectly, specialized datasets may also be gathered for benchmarking (e.g., DroidBench), testing types
of obfuscation (e.g., DroidChameleon), amongst others, would also be highly useful to identify
specific weakness or traits in analyses, detection, and classification techniques.
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6.2.2. Scalability, Accuracy, and Portability. Scalability is a vital trait as the body of malware
grows and diversifies. This is due to the sheer number of samples that need to be analyzed, but so
we can quickly identify new malware, flag them for further analysis, and notify others. While most
systems scale well enough, some do trade scalability for accuracy, and visa versa, and improvements
for both are being continuously developed. Despite developing faster or more accurate classifiers,
finding different feature sets or ways to map the features into a vector space that the classifier can
use have also improved accuracy and performance [Zhang et al. 2014].
Tables V and VI attempt to make note of any performance statistics or scalability information.
They also attempt to base each framework’s sturdiness on several key points, made previously con-
cerning native code, Java reflection, VM-awareness, and obfuscation. With Tables V and VI, we
discovered that several systems were able to detect, but not analyze, samples with such traits. Fur-
thermore, these traits often contributed to their false positives/negatives. An encouraging number of
frameworks such as Apposcopy [Feng et al. 2014] are making efforts to overcome limitations like
low levels of obfuscation, but still do not cope with higher ones. Portability is also essential, so that
malware can be analyzed on multiple Android OS versions, as they have different vulnerabilities,
and to minimize the window of vulnerability whenever a new Android version is released.
6.2.3. Significant Changes in Android. One of the most recent, significant, change to Android has
been the switch from the Dalvik runtime to the ART runtime. This was introduced in Android ver-
sion 5.0 in 2015. Moderate changes to the operating system itself are introduced with each Android
version which, as seen in Table VII, happens frequently (i.e., more often than traditional operating
systems). Changes to the kernel have also been made, albeit less frequently, with the introduction of
Android 2.x and 4.x [Tam et al. 2015a]. Ideally, solutions should be agnostic to the parts of Android
that may frequently change, however many static solutions rely on the Dalvik dex file, as opposed
to the new odex files, and many dynamic solutions either modify or are very in-tuned with specific
aspects of Dalvik runtime internals. It is possible that no more drastic changes will be made to
the Android OS, but ideally frameworks and techniques should be resilient or easily adaptable to
changes within Android. The benefit of this is high portability across all Android versions, possible
Android variants applied to the future IoT, and possibly even other platforms.
Table VII. Frequency of Android OS version releases (x.y.[0,1] translates to version x.y and x.y.1).
Android
Version 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
1.0 1.1
Cupcake 1.5
Doughnut 1.6
Eclair 2.0.[0,1] 2.1
Froyo 2.2 2.2.[1,2,3]
Gingerbread 2.3.[0,1] 2.3.[2,3,4,5,6,7]
Honeycomb 3.[0,1,2],3.2.[1,2,3,4] 3.2.[5,6]
IcecreamSandwich 4.0.[0,1,2,3]
Jelly
Bean
4.1.[0,1,2],
4.2, 4.2.1
4.2.2,
4.3.[0,1]
KitKat 4.4.[0,1,2] 4.4.[3,4]
Lollipop 5.0.[0,1,2] 5.1.[0,1]
6.3. Future Research Directions
In summary, we feel Android malware analysis is trending in the right direction. Many simple
solutions and anti-virus products do provide protection against the bulk of malware, but methods
such as bytecode signatures are weak against the growing amount of advanced and contemporary
malware [Securelist 2013; Symantec 2013; McAfee 2015; Vidas and Christin 2013]. We therefore
suggest the following areas for future research.
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6.3.1. Hybrid Analysis and Multi-leveled Analysis. Static solutions are beginning to harden against
trivial obfuscations [Feng et al. 2014], but many apps, and most malware, are already using higher
levels of obfuscation [Felt et al. 2011; Securelist 2013]. As recent static systems are still effec-
tive, and scalable, we suggest that, in the cases where obfuscation (e.g., native code, reflection,
encryption) is detected, dynamic analysis can be used in conjunction for completion. Alternatively,
dynamic solutions inherently have less code coverage, but can use static analysis to guide analyses
through more paths [Zheng et al. 2012; Spreitzenbarth et al. 2013; Mahmood et al. 2014], or use
apps exercisers like MonkeyRunner, manual input, or intelligent event injectors [Azim and Neamtiu
2013; Machiry et al. 2013; Mahmood et al. 2014].
Hybrid solutions could therefore combine static and dynamic analysis in ways that their added
strengths mitigate each other’s weakness. For example, the Harvester [Rasthofer et al. 2015] tool can
reduce obfuscation generated by encrypted strings and reflective methods with its hybrid methods. It
also seems beneficial to develop multi-level systems, as it often provides more, richer, features. Fur-
thermore, in a multi-level system analysis, it would be harder for malware to hide actions if multiple
layers of the Android architecture are being monitored. Parallel processing could also greatly en-
hance multi-level analyses and provide faster detection systems [Dini et al. 2012]. The downside of
this multi-level methods, however, is it can cause large additional overhead, decrease transparency,
increase chances of code bugs, and may be less portable.
6.3.2. Code Coverage. As mentioned previously, code coverage is essential for complete, robust
malware analyses. Statically, this can be difficult when dealing with dynamically loaded code, native
code, and network-based activity. Dynamically, this is challenging as only one path is shown per ex-
ecution, user interactions are difficult to automate, and malware may have split behaviors. There are
several benefits to dynamic out-of-the-box solutions, considering the launch of ART [Vitas 2013],
like being able to cope with multiple available Android versions, and to bar malware avoiding anal-
yses with native code or reflection. For example, system-call centric analysis is out-of-the-box but
can still analyze Android-level behaviors and dynamic network behaviors [Tam et al. 2015b] and
can be used to stop certain root exploits [Vidas and Christin 2014]. While hybrid solutions and
smarter stimulations (e.g., IntelliDroid, a static and dynamic API-based input generator [Wong and
Lie 2016]) would greatly increase code coverage, different approaches should be further researched
based on malware trends. For example, while manual input is normally not scalable, crowdsourc-
ing [Gianazza et al. 2014] may be an interesting approach. However, zero-day malware will intro-
duce complications as time is needed to create and collect user input traces.
Code coverage also introduces an interesting question on whether malware tend to use “easily”
chosen paths to execute more malicious behavior, or harder paths to avoid detection. This would be
an interesting area for future research, as it would help identify malware trends and, therein, increase
the effectiveness of future analyses. Another topic that may be beneficial is identifying and under-
standing subsets of malware behavior through path restrictions (e.g., remove permissions or triggers
like user UI or system events), to see what behavior equates to what permission(s) and/or trigger(s).
We also feel that there needs to be a better understanding of when an event is user-triggered or per-
formed in the background and how. To increase code coverage, apps should also be run on several
different Android OS versions as different versions have different sets of vulnerabilities. This would
be much more difficult to implement if any modifications were made to the Dalvik VM or the OS
to accommodate for high level analyses, but feasible with out-of-the-box analyses.
6.3.3. Hybrid Devices and Virtualization. In addition to smart stimuli, modifying emulators for
increased transparency (e.g., realistic GPS, realistic phone identifiers) or using emulators with ac-
cess to real physical hardware (e.g., sensors, accelerometer) to fool VM-aware malware may prove
useful and interesting [Zaddach et al. 2014]. Newer, more sophisticated, malware from 2014 and
2015 are becoming increasingly aware of emulated environments, but achieving a perfect emulator
is, unfortunately, unfeasible. Things such as a timing attack, where certain operations are timed for
discrepancies, are still open problems for traditional malware as well and are difficult to fool.
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Furthermore, malware such as DenDroid, Android.HeHe do not just detect their emulated en-
vironments, but often hide their malicious behaviors or tamper with the environment. Based on a
previous study, malware can check on several device features to detect emulators. This includes,
but does not stop at, the device IMEI, routing table, timing attacks, realistic sensory output, and
the serial number of the device [Petsas et al. 2014]. It is also possible to fingerprint and identify
particular emulated environments, such as different dynamic analysis frameworks, via the device
performance features aforementioned [Maier et al. 2014]. One solution to this problem would be to
use real devices in all dynamic experiments. However, this makes analyzing large malware sets a
laborious and expensive task, as many devices would be needed as well as a way to restore a device
to a clean state for quick, efficient, and reliable analysis.
Here we would also like to propose combining real devices and emulators as a new hybrid so-
lution, where real devices pass necessary values to emulators to enhance their transparency. Data
from a real device can also be slightly and randomly altered in order to generate information for
multiple emulators. This would ideally reduce the cost and speed of experiments while revealing
more malicious behaviors. A similar hybrid device method has proved to be effective for analyzing
embedded systems’ firmware [Zaddach et al. 2014], and it would be very interesting to see if it
would also work for Android malware detection and analysis, and how effective it would be against
VM-aware malware. As an alternative to virtualization, it would also be interesting to see if splitting
the kernel, where untrusted system calls are directed to the hardened kernel code, can be applied to
Android. This method has only been applied to a traditional Linux kernel, and it would be interest-
ing if regular application system calls can be redirected to, and monitored by, the hardened part of
the “split” kernel [Kurmus and Zippel 2014]. Lastly, we look forward to new technology, such as the
new ARM with full virtualization support, and more explorations into ART and its new challenges.
7. CONCLUSION
This article studied a wide range of Android malware analysis and detection frameworks, illustrating
changing trends in their methods. This article also discussed Android malware’s ability to obstruct
analysis and avoid detection, including its roots in traditional malware when applicable. By ana-
lyzing both threats and solutions, this article evaluated the effectiveness of several current analysis
and detection methods in order to understand, and suggest, several areas for future research in more
scalable, portable, and accurate manners for Android. This differs from previous surveys studying
mobile security in general, Android malware attacks only, and more general Android security.
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